





ANTITRUST IN ZERO-PRICE MARKETS: FOUNDATIONS 
JOHN M. NEWMAN† 
“Zero-price markets,” wherein firms set the price of their goods or services at $0, 
have exploded in quantity and variety. Creative content, software, search functions, 
social media platforms, mobile applications, travel booking, navigation and 
mapping systems, and myriad other goods and services are now widely distributed 
at zero prices. But despite the exponential increase in the volume of zero-price 
products being consumed, antitrust institutions and analysts have failed to provide 
an adequate response to markets without prices. 
Modern antitrust law is firmly grounded in neoclassical economics, which is in 
turn centered on price theory. Steeped in price theory, preeminent antitrust theorists 
have urged that without prices there can be no markets, and consequently no market 
power. This heavy methodological dependence on positive prices has led antitrust 
courts and enforcement agencies to overlook potentially massive welfare harms. 
Unfortunately, recent empirical research confirms that such harms have already occurred. 
These failures to conceive of zero-price markets as antitrust “markets” indicate 
how fundamentally zero prices challenge traditional theories and analytical frameworks. 
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This Article establishes a novel taxonomy of customer-facing costs, distinguishing 
“market-signaling” from “non-market-signaling” costs. Crucially, it demonstrates 
that market-signaling costs are present in many zero-price contexts. The absence of 
positive prices thus does not foreclose antitrust scrutiny; “trade,” for purposes of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts, encompasses zero-price transactions. To continue 
ignoring welfare harms in these markets would be both unjust and inefficient. The 
Article concludes by identifying antitrust law’s proper role within—and stance 
toward—zero-price markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite its ubiquity and vital importance to the broad economy, antitrust 
law has failed to develop an adequate response to zero-price markets. Zero-price 
products—i.e., products for which firms set the price to customers at $0—have 
existed for decades.1 Alongside the advent of the Internet, however, they 
exploded in number, variety, and popularity.2 With a combined market 
capitalization that easily exceeds $1 trillion,3 firms offering zero-price products 
account for a robust and growing portion of the national output. 
In light of the critical importance of zero-price markets to the overall 
economy, antitrust law’s nearly complete lack of attention to their functioning 
and implications is indefensible. What little precedent and commentary does 
exist tends to conclude summarily that antitrust law does not apply to “free” 
products.4 Without prices, the argument runs, there can be no markets.5 And 
without markets, there is no need for antitrust scrutiny.6 
This Article seeks to fill the gap left by, and to refute, these scattered 
decisions and comments. The choice of title was deliberate: to call zero-price 
products “free” is to beg the question.7 In common usage, “free” denotes 
zero cost.8 If zero-price products were indeed “free,” it would be impossible 
 
1 David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Free, 7 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 71, 76 (2011) 
[hereinafter Evans, Antitrust Economics]. Common historical examples include broadcast radio, 
broadcast television, and zero-price weekly newspapers. 
2 See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the 
Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. REV. 606, 606 (2014) (“Offers of free services abound on 
the Internet.”). 
3 See, e.g., Market Capitalization of the Largest U.S. Internet Companies as of February 2015, STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/209331/largest-us-internet-companies-by-market-cap/ 
[http://perma.cc/9VMN-FFZ3] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). Of the ten largest Internet companies 
listed, seven offered primarily or exclusively zero-price products—and these seven firms alone 
accounted for over $750 billion in market capitalization. 
4 See infra Section II.B. 
5 See infra notes 60–75 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
7 For one example, see Mark R. Patterson, Google and Search-Engine Market Power, HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, July 2013, at 17, http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/ 
antitrust/articles/Patterson.pdf [http://perma.cc/HC69-4EUY] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). Patterson 
writes, “In fact, of course, Google provides its search results for free.” Id. With that summary 
conclusion, he dismisses information costs in a footnote, observing without further explanation 
that “one could take the view that in making searches on a search engine, users provide that search 
engine with valuable information for which they are not paid.” Id. at 17 n.51. 
8 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS 
IN A CONNECTED WORLD 12 (2001) (“[W]henever one says a resource is ‘free,’ most believe that 
a price is being quoted—free, that is, as in zero cost.”).  
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for consumer welfare to be harmed via the overcharges and output 
restrictions targeted by antitrust law.9 Calling such products “free” without 
explaining how or why for-profit firms would offer them while getting 
nothing in return amounts to “the substitution of rhetoric for argument.”10 
After describing the basic structure of zero-price markets in Part I, the 
Article turns to one of its primary tasks: correcting the rhetoric noted above 
by demonstrating that “free” products are not free. Toward that end, Part II 
establishes a novel taxonomy of costs that customers may incur, separating 
these costs into “market-signaling” and “non-market-signaling.” The first 
premise of the argument is descriptive—customers of zero-price products 
pay for those products, primarily by exchanging their attention, information, 
or both. Given the presence of these market-signaling costs, zero-price products 
can fall within the statutory scope of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Further 
support for this claim is found in the common law of contracts: multiple courts 
have recognized that information and attention can serve as consideration, thus 
signaling the presence of an enforceable bargained-for exchange.11 Part II 
concludes with a deontological claim: by failing to address zero-price markets, 
the antitrust enterprise12 has incorrectly deviated from its statutory mandate. 
Part III addresses the function and functioning of zero-price markets, 
demonstrating that they exhibit competition—albeit imperfect (and perhaps 
highly imperfect) competition. To illuminate further the competitive 
processes in zero-price markets, Part III draws on a body of behavioral 
economics research analyzing the effect of zero prices on consumer 
preferences. With these foundations in mind, Part III then turns to the 
question of antitrust harm, using a recent historical example as illustrative. 
In 1996, the Telecommunications Act deregulated ownership in broadcast 
radio markets.13 A massive wave of industry consolidation followed, leaving 
 
9 See infra Section III.D. 
10 Herbert Hovenkamp, Rhetoric and Skepticism in Antitrust Argument, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1721, 
1721 (1986); see also David Foster Wallace, Tense Present: Democracy, English, and the Wars over Usage, 
HARPER’S MAG., Apr. 2001, at 39, 47 n.23 (“[L]anguage is . . . irreducibly public, political, and 
ideological.”); id. at 55 (“Usage is always political, of course . . . .”). In the consumer protection 
context, Hoofnagle & Whittington apply a transaction-cost-economics approach to rightly 
conclude that “free online products and services may give people the impression that firms do not 
need to recoup the cost of producing the goods they consume. This is not the case.” Hoofnagle & 
Whittington, supra note 2, at 620. 
11 See infra subsections II.C.2.b.i-ii (discussing Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel & Casino, 109 F. 
Supp. 2d 324 (E.D. Pa. 2000), and Jennings v. Radio Station KSCS, 96.3 FM, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 60 
(Tex. App. 1986)). 
12 This phrase is borrowed from HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: 
PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION (2005). 
13 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
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many geographical markets highly concentrated or entirely monopolized.14 
Yet the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division, which was 
responsible for reviewing hundreds of industry mergers and acquisitions, 
never once analyzed whether harm to listeners might result.15 The intuitions 
set forth in this Article would contrarily predict the possibility of such 
harm—and, in fact, recent empirical research confirms that widespread 
monopoly overcharges of attention costs followed this zero-price-market 
concentration.16 Part III concludes with a consequentialist appeal: the 
ongoing failure to apply antitrust in zero-price markets has already caused—
and will continue to cause—substantial harm to society. 
Finally, Part IV addresses the role of antitrust law in zero-price markets. 
The aim is to provide foundational, rather than exhaustive, insights. Many 
of the tools developed by antitrust and economics scholars are facially 
inapplicable absent prices, but can be made workable via surprisingly minor 
alterations.17 Of immediate importance is recognizing that antitrust law 
does encompass zero-price markets. The collective failure to do so has 
already resulted in massive consumer welfare harms. As zero-price markets 
continue to expand at an exponential rate of growth, persisting in this 
failure will concomitantly become increasingly detrimental to society. This 
Article thus concludes with a call to abandon the current path and shift 
instead toward a more coherent and efficient body of antitrust law, one that 
takes full account of zero-price markets. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF ZERO-PRICE MARKETS 
The antitrust enterprise has paid little attention to the structure and 
functioning of markets involving zero-price products. What scant 
commentary exists does, however, provide a useful starting point. This is 
particularly so with regard to understanding the basic structure of zero-price 
 
14 See Bruce Houghton, Why Radio Plays Same 20 Songs: The Sad Truth of Media Consolidation, 
HYPEBOT (May 23, 2012), http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2012/05/the-sad-truth-of-media-consolidation-
infographic.html [http://perma.cc/SZ39-ZUVG] (“The sad truth of the matter is that only six 
companies control 90% of the media . . . .”). 
15 See infra notes 244–45 and accompanying text.  
16 See infra notes 237–56 and accompanying text. 
17 I explore these issues, as well as issues relating to antitrust standing, injury, and damages 
calculations, at length in a draft follow-up to this Article. See John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price 
Markets: Application (Sept. 19, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Newman, Application]. 
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markets.18 Consequently, a survey of and contribution to the literature on 
the predominant zero-price business models follows. 
A market involving zero prices is, as a structural matter, very different 
from the markets that gave rise to modern antitrust law and theory. The 
central feature exhibited by zero-price markets is the interrelated nature of 
the relevant products.19 To profitably offer products at a price of $0 in the 
long term, a rational firm must intend to turn a profit in some manner not 
involving those products.  
A. Sustainable Models 
Multiple categories of sustainable (i.e., long-run) business models have 
gained prominence in zero-price markets. These include tying strategies, 
two- or multisided models,20 and “premium upgrade” or (more commonly) 
“freemium” models.21 The common thread between each of these categories 
is the presence of interrelated products.22 Where for-profit firms are 
competing in zero-price markets, invariably they are making money somehow. 
In this context, they do so by offering some other product that is somehow 
interrelated with the zero-price product. 
 
18 Evans, Antitrust Economics, supra note 1, appears to be the most salient prior work. This 
Article seeks to fill gaps left by Evans, who focused on the economic structure of markets 
involving “free” products but less heavily on how the antitrust enterprise should function in such 
markets. Evans’s primary conclusion was that the presence of a zero-price product should serve as 
a “red flag” to analysts, signaling that traditional antitrust methodology may be inappropriate. See 
id. at 81 (“The fact that a product is free is not, however, completely irrelevant to the practice of 
antitrust. A price of zero provides a red flag that the textbook model of competition and standard 
antitrust analysis do not apply to the product in question.”). As Evans points out, “Many of the 
issues discussed in this article for free goods also apply to products that are provided at prices 
below the marginal cost of production.” Id. at 86. Where many of the issues Evans discusses apply 
outside the context of zero prices, this Article confronts squarely and exclusively issues that arise 
uniquely in zero-price markets. In a subsequent paper, David S. Evans, Attention Rivalry Among 
Online Platforms, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 313 (2013) [hereinafter Evans, Attention 
Rivalry], Evans minimizes the importance of consumer-facing product differentiation, in favor of 
focusing on the competition among online businesses “for a limited amount of attention from 
consumers.” Id. at 315. This argument tends to miss the mark by ignoring the possibility that a 
monopolist controlling a consumer-facing market could extract supracompetitive amounts of 
attention. See infra notes 233–34 and accompanying text. Many authors have written specifically 
about Google’s conduct, particularly its alleged manipulation of its search results. For one such 
(Google-sponsored) article, see James D. Ratliff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Is There a Market for Organic 
Search Engine Results and Can Their Manipulation Give Rise to Antitrust Liability?, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 517 (2014). Their arguments are discussed in Newman, Application, supra note 17. 
19 See Evans, Antitrust Economics, supra note 1, at 81. 
20 See Evans, Attention Rivalry, supra note 18, at 341-42.  
21 John M. Newman, Copyright Freeconomics, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1409, 1439 (2013) [hereinafter 
Newman, Copyright Freeconomics]. 
22 Evans, Antitrust Economics, supra note 1, at 81-82. 
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The first commonly used zero-price strategy involves complementary 
products. Firms offering zero-price products often simultaneously offer 
complementary products.23 These complementary products may be tied or nontied. 
Tying strategies may be either contractual or technological. In a 
contractual tying arrangement, the sale of one product (the tying product) 
is conditioned on the sale of the other (the tied product). Where consumers 
purchase a fixed unit of the tying product and amounts of the tied product 
that vary with the use of the tying product, the tie is a variable proportion 
tie.24 Firms can use such arrangements to earn greater profits from users 
who exhibit greater demand for the tied product—that is, to price 
discriminate. In International Salt Co. v. United States, for example, the 
defendant contractually conditioned sales of its patented salt processors 
(purchased in fixed units) on the purchase of salt tablets (purchased in 
volumes that varied with customer demand).25 
Technological ties involve integrating what could be considered as two 
separate products. Microsoft famously tied its Windows operating system to 
its Internet Explorer web browser (a non–variable proportion tie, as 
customers demanded fixed units of each “product”).26 Google has been 
accused of violating the antitrust laws in similar fashion by bundling its 
mobile applications with its zero-price Android mobile operating system.27 
An example of a variable proportion technological tie involving zero prices 
can be found in In re Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust Litigation.28 Apple was able 
to offer its proprietary iTunes software—the tying product—to consumers 
free of charge because it was simultaneously profiting from sales of the tied 
product: digital music (via its iTunes Store).29 Allegedly, Apple modified 
the iTunes object code such that only songs purchased from Apple’s iTunes 
Store (and not from competitors) would play through iTunes.30 
 
23 Minsuk Han, Barely Legal: The Antitrust Economics of Free Software: Can Firms Evade 
Antitrust Scrutiny by Selling Apps for Free?, CORNELL DAILY SUN (May 2, 2014, 1:00 AM), 
http://cornellsun.com/blog/2014/05/02/barely-legal-the-antitrust-economics-of-free-software-
can-firms-evade-antitrust-scrutiny-by-selling-apps-for-free/ [http://perma.cc/MR8H-W7NN]. 
24 Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements, in 2 THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 329, 334 (Roger D. Blair & D. 
Daniel Sokol eds., 2015). 
25 332 U.S. 392, 394-96 (1947), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
26 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
27 Class Action Complaint, Feitelson v. Google Inc., No. 5:14-cv-02007 (N.D. Cal. filed May 1, 2014). 
28 796 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
29 Id. at 140; see also John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 681, 698 (2012) [hereinafter Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design] (“With 
the iTunes Music Store, Apple was entering a new market—the market for audio-file downloads.”). 
30 Apple iPod iTunes, 796 F. Supp. 2d at 1146-47. 
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Some zero-price strategies involving complementary products do not 
entail tying in either form. For example, many online travel services offer 
both airline and hotel booking. The two products often are consumed 
together—they are complements, not substitutes. Yet they are frequently 
nontied—consumers are free to use one or both. 
Not all complementary-products strategies are anticompetitive, regardless 
whether the relevant products are offered at zero or positive prices.31 But 
the interrelated nature of complementary products does create multiple 
avenues for anticompetitive behavior by a firm with market power in at least 
one of the relevant product markets.32 
A second common business form involving zero prices is the multisided 
platform. Multisided markets comprise multiple distinct groups of customers 
who interact with one another via a platform, which sits astride the market 
and, for a fee, performs the function of bringing the customer groups 
together.33 In a multisided platform market, at least one of the customer 
groups positively values the presence of the other. General purpose credit 
card networks, for example, bring merchants and consumers together via a 
complex system of acquirers, processors, and issuing banks.34 While 
merchants pay substantial fees for this service, some cardholders can access 
it for a price of zero—indeed, many are essentially charged a negative price 
in the form of loyalty points or other rewards.35 Card networks aside, many 
(if not most) multisided markets involving zero-price products are at least partially 
supported by advertising revenues. Broadcast television, content-streaming 
services, and online search all are widely offered to consumers as zero-price, 
ad-supported services.36 Profitability in such markets turns on whether 
 
31 Variable proportion ties are thought to be extractive (they allow producers to extract more 
from consumers) but not exclusionary (they do not exclude rivals from the market). 
32 See HANS-WERNER GOTTINGER, ECONOMIES OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 71-73 
(2003) (discussing anticompetitive behavior in complementary-goods markets and noting that 
“complementary markets are susceptible to single-firm dominance because of the need to interface 
with the dominant firm’s installed customer base in the primary market and because of the 
dominant firm’s first-mover advantages derived from better and earlier access to the relevant interface”). 
33 For the seminal paper on platform competition, see Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003). 
34 See generally Nicholas Economides, Competition Policy Issues in the Consumer Payments 
Industry (providing an overview of the credit card industry), in MOVING MONEY: THE FUTURE 
OF CONSUMER PAYMENTS 113 (Robert E. Litan & Martin Neil Baily eds., 2009). 
35 See ROBIN A. PRAGER ET AL., FED. RESERVE BD., DIVS. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS & 
MONETARY AFFAIRS, INTERCHANGE FEES AND PAYMENT CARD NETWORKS: ECONOMICS, 
INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS, AND POLICY ISSUES 8 (2009) (“[H]igh fees for merchants and 
low or negative fees for card users may cause overuse of payment cards . . . .”). 
36 Newman, Copyright Freeconomics, supra note 21, at 1439-40. 
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firms who have acquired a group of consumers can then sell those consumers’ 
information or attention (or both) to advertisers or data-seekers.37 
Third, businesses may operate using a freemium strategy. This consists 
of firms offering a basic version of a good or service for $0, while offering a 
higher quality version of the service at a positive price.38 Freemium 
offerings have become particularly prolific in digital-content markets, where 
they are often combined with ad-supported strategies to form “hybrid” 
models.39 Hybrid models may feature advertisements for third-party products 
and/or for the supplier’s own for-pay version of the service.40 
B.  Nonsustainable Strategies 
A second group of zero-price business strategies can be termed 
“nonsustainable.” These are strategies that for-profit firms cannot depend on 
for long-run profitability. As an initial matter, some products are offered at 
zero prices for nonfinancial reasons. For example, nonprofit organizations 
may be able to offer zero-price services at a loss, depending instead on 
charitable donations for their survival.41 Individuals also frequently offer 
goods and services at zero prices, motivated by nonpecuniary (or at least not 
directly pecuniary) incentives. A classic example is the Linux operating 
system, which is available free of charge and is maintained by a large open-source 
community of volunteers.42 
Another set of nonsustainable zero-price business strategies depends on 
recoupment. Firms may temporarily offer zero prices for promotional 
reasons,43 planning to recoup the costs of the zero-price transactions after 
 
37 See infra subsection II.C.2. 
38 See generally Koen Pauwels & Allen Weiss, Moving from Free to Fee: How Online Firms 
Market to Change Their Business Model Successfully, J. MARKETING, May 2008, at 14 (providing a 
general overview of pricing options faced by digital content providers who wish to charge positive prices). 
39 See Newman, Copyright Freeconomics, supra note 21, at 1439. 
40 See, e.g., id. (“For example, Hulu adopted a hybrid freemium model consisting of a 
stripped-down, ad-supported, zero-price version and a paid-subscription (albeit also ad-supported) 
service dubbed ‘Hulu Plus.’” (citation omitted)).  
41 One example is the Wikimedia Foundation, which operates Wikipedia. See Kamelia 
Angelova, Why the Most Popular Online Information Source Is a Non-Profit Organization, BUS. 
INSIDER (May 12, 2010, 3:42 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/jimmy-wales-wikipedia-non-
profit-2010-5 [http://perma.cc/XQ6D-8YND]. Wikipedia also draws on volunteer laborers as a zero-
price input. Jodi L. Wilson, Proceed with Extreme Caution: Citation to Wikipedia in Light of 
Contributor Demographics and Content Policies, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 857, 875 (2014). 
42 Wallace v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 467 F.3d 1104, 1106 (7th Cir. 2006). See generally id. 
(holding that the GPL open-source copyright license was not a conspiracy in restraint of trade for 
Sherman Act purposes); Heidi S. Bond, Note, What’s So Great About Nothing? The GNU General Public 
License and the Zero-Price-Fixing Problem, 104 MICH. L. REV. 547 (2005) (offering the same argument). 
43 These could include, for example, increasing brand image or awareness. 
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the promotion ends. Similarly, a new entrant might offer zero prices during 
the entry period in order to attract initial customers, then begin charging 
positive prices after the product gains sufficient marketplace exposure.44 
Under this model, the new entrant incurs initial losses in order to gain 
enough traction (e.g., scale, scope, and market power) to become competitive.45 
Less benignly, firms may offer zero prices as part of a predatory-pricing 
scheme.46 As with typical predatory-pricing strategies, a firm would initially 
offer low (here, zero) prices, drive rivals to exit the market, and then recoup 
any losses by charging monopoly prices.47 Scholars have recognized that such 
schemes may be anticompetitive.48 
II.  ZERO-PRICE MARKETS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF ANTITRUST LAW 
Customers incur multiple types of costs en route to accessing zero-price 
products. Some of these are the types of costs that do not necessarily signal 
the presence of markets. Others, however, do signal marketplace activity—
“trade” or “commerce” in the language of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
Antitrust law applies where customers incur market-signaling costs, even 
absent above-zero prices. 
 
44 See Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 
284, 336-37 (1977) (noting that such a model “allows the new [market] entrant greater latitude by 
permitting very low prices (even give-aways) for announcement purposes,” and “thus encourage[s] 
customers to try the product on an experimental basis”). 
45 Cf. Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The Case 
Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 171, 211 (2011) (“[I]n a perfectly 
competitive, nonnetworked industry, where incumbents are charging a price equal to marginal 
cost . . . [,] entrants are forced to suffer initial losses, compete on nonprice dimensions, or improve 
production efficiency.”). 
46 The Government alleged a predatory-pricing scheme in its case against Microsoft. 
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Findings of Fact at 514, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 
30 (D.D.C. 2000) (Civ. Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233 (TPJ)) (“Microsoft set a zero price for its browser 
for the purpose of depriving Netscape of revenue and protecting its operating system monopoly.”). 
47 See, e.g., Wallace, 467 F.3d at 1106 (describing this three-stage process of a predatory-pricing scheme). 
48 See, e.g., Michal S. Gal & Daniel Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for 
Antitrust Enforcement 3 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 14-44, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2529425 [http://perma.cc/X77H-RU9J] (“The negative effects of the 
short-term provision of free goods by a monopolist have been recognized and are restricted under 
the predatory pricing prohibition, based on a two-stage strategy in which the price is raised and 
initial losses recouped once the threat of entry or expansion is lifted.”).  
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A.  The Statutory Standard: “Trade” or “Commerce” 
The Sherman Act, by its terms, applies only to “trade or commerce.”49 
The Clayton Act generally applies to “commerce.”50 Throughout the 
century-plus span of its history, antitrust jurisprudence has repeatedly 
recognized that Congress, in so drafting the antitrust laws, intended to cut a 
wide path.51 Application was to be as comprehensive as possible. In 1944, 
the Supreme Court stated that “[o]n its face [the Sherman Act] shows a 
carefully studied attempt to bring within the Act every person engaged in 
business whose activities might restrain or monopolize commercial 
intercourse among the states.”52 The same Court also observed “[t]hat Congress 
wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust 
and monopoly agreements . . . admits of little, if any, doubt.”53 Thus, the 
scope of antitrust “trade or commerce” can be seen as coextensive with the 
scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause—and the latter has 
an extraordinarily broad scope.54 Echoing these sentiments in 1975, the 
Court held that the practice of law involves “trade or commerce” under the 
Sherman Act, stating that “Congress intended to strike as broadly as it 
could in § 1 of the Sherman Act.”55 
Clearly, the scope of U.S. antitrust law is broad. Precisely defining 
“trade” and “commerce” is no simple task, but the Court has helpfully 
phrased antitrust law’s focus as “commercial competition in the marketing 
of goods or services.”56 More recently, in a 2012 ruling involving an antitrust 
challenge to certain NCAA bylaws, the Seventh Circuit approvingly quoted 
the leading antitrust treatise: “[T]he Sherman Act applies to commercial 
 
49 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (prohibiting restraints “of trade or commerce”); id. § 2 (banning 
monopolization or attempted monopolization of “any part of . . . trade or commerce”). 
50 See, e.g., id. § 18 (prohibiting mergers and acquisitions that may substantially lessen 
competition “in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce”). 
51 For a particularly comprehensive survey of the common law history underlying the 
meaning of “trade,” see United States v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 110 F.2d 703, 707-11 (D.C. Cir. 1940). 
52 United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944), superseded by statute, 
McCarran–Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012) (clarifying that the insurance industry 
generally does not fall within the Sherman Act’s ambit), as recognized in Barnett Bank of Marion 
Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 40 (1996). 
53 Id. at 558. 
54 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (holding that the federal government can 
regulate a farmer’s consumption of homegrown wheat under the Commerce Clause because in the 
aggregate such consumption had a substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
55 Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975). 
56 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940). 
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transactions, and the modern definition of commerce includes ‘almost every 
activity from which [an] actor anticipates economic gain.’”57 
This understanding—that antitrust laws apply to transactions from 
which actors anticipate economic gain—accords with the intent of Congress 
as elucidated by the Supreme Court. Such transactions necessarily involve 
an exchange, the foundation of economic “gains from trade.”58 An actor 
gives up something that is of less value to her than the consideration she 
acquires from her trading counterpart. Her counterpart, meanwhile, values 
what he acquires more than what he trades away. For each party, the benefits 
outweigh the costs. Each side is made better off by the trade.59 This 
behavior is what is contemplated when antitrust courts, enforcement 
agencies, and commentators refer to “markets,” or in the statutory parlance, 
“trade” and “commerce.” 
B.  The Counterargument: No Prices, No Welfare Harms 
Courts, enforcers, and theorists have concluded that without prices, 
there can be no welfare harms of the type that antitrust law seeks to 
prevent. In zero-price contexts, the argument runs, customers do not pay 
anything in exchange because the relevant products are “free.” As a result, 
there can be no monopoly overcharges, and there is no need for antitrust 
scrutiny. The following discussion gives a flavor of this argument. 
United States legal precedent contains multiple examples of courts 
creating de jure antitrust immunity by declining to apply antitrust scrutiny 
in zero-price contexts. These courts have done so on the grounds that the 
antitrust laws cannot apply in the absence of prices. And (although 
generally beyond the scope of this Article) the European Union’s (EU) top 
regulator has similarly concluded that competition law does not apply to 
“free markets.”60 
 
57 Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 340 (7th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting 1A 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 260b (2d ed. 2000)). 
58 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989, 1055 (1997) (“In the Coasean world, two parties may be expected to agree if 
there is a surplus to be gained from the agreement.”). 
59 This fundamental insight paved the way for the concept of comparative advantage, as thus 
described by Adam Smith: “The tailor does not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them of 
the shoemaker. The shoemaker does not attempt to make his own clothes, but employs a 
tailor. . . . [Each] of them find[s] it for their interest to employ their whole industry in a way in 
which they have some advantage over their neighbors . . . .” ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS pt. 2, at 161-62 (P.F. Collier & Son 1902) (1776). 
60 See Miguel Sousa Ferro, “Ceci N’est Pas un Marché”: Gratuity and Competition Law, REVUE 
DES DROITS DE LA CONCURRENCES, Feb. 2015, at 1, 7-10 (Fr.)  (collecting cases relating to competition 
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In Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., the plaintiffs (small 
regional photographers) alleged that the defendants (large national 
photographers) provided high school yearbook photographs to students free 
of charge, but anticompetitively tied the sale of individual portraits to the 
“free” yearbook photos.61 “The district court, relying on an affidavit which stated 
that in all cases the yearbook photographs were provided at no charge . . . , 
dismissed the claim, holding that a ‘tying arrangement cannot exist when the 
tying product is not sold to the consumer, but is provided free of charge.’”62 
More recently, in Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc.,63 a U.S. district 
court took an even stronger position. The plaintiff, KinderStart, operated a 
childcare-focused website.64 In its complaint, KinderStart alleged that 
search giant Google anticompetitively manipulated search results in a 
scheme to monopolize the “Search Market.”65 En route to dismissing the 
plaintiff ’s claim, the district court reasoned that KinderStart “failed to 
allege that the Search Market is a ‘grouping of sales.’ It does not claim that 
Google sells its search services, or that any other search provider does so.”66 
The court further observed that “KinderStart cites no authority indicating that 
antitrust law concerns itself with competition in the provision of free services.”67 
Scholars and enforcers have voiced similar views. In 2012, Robert 
Bork—whose impact on the development of modern U.S. antitrust law 
remains immense—wrote a passionate editorial addressing then-ongoing 
investigations of search provider Google by U.S. and EU enforcement 
 
law in several EU industries including television, radio, print media, and internet); Christian Kersting & 
Sebastian Dworschak, Does Google Hold a Dominant Market Position?—Addressing the (Minor) Significance 
of High Online User Shares 2 (Julia Holtz trans., 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2495300 [http://perma.cc/TR7C-9YLT] (“[R]egulatory precedent to-date has dismissed the 
existence of ‘markets’ for competition law purposes where the products or services at issue are provided 
for free.” (translating Christian Kersting & Sebastian Dworschak, Google als Marktbeherrscher?—Zur 
(Geringen) Aussagekraft Hoher Nutzerzahlen im Internet, IFO SCHNELLDIENST, Aug. 2014, at 7, 7 (Ger.))). 
61 713 F. Supp. 937, 938-40 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff ’d, 903 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1990). 
62 Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 991 (4th Cir. 1990). The 
appellate court apparently accepted this line of reasoning, although it did add the more sensible 
proposition that “[b]ecause the students had the option to purchase portraits and their decision 
whether to purchase had no effect on their yearbook photographs, the relationship here did not 
constitute a tying arrangement.” Id. 
63 No. C 06-2057 JF(RS), 2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007). 
64 Id. at *1. 
65 Id. at *4. 
66 Id. at *5 (emphasis added). 
67 Id. (emphasis added). It is possible that, had KinderStart alleged a two-sided market 
comprising both search results and all Internet advertising, the court would have allowed the claim 
to proceed. See id. at *6 (“KinderStart might have argued that the Search Market and the Search 
Ad Market combine to form one market for antitrust purposes.”). 
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agencies.68 The editorial states that “[r]egulators may attempt to 
develop . . . antitrust complaints against the search engines but they are 
unsupportable. There is no coherent case for monopolization because a 
search engine, like Google, is free to consumers.”69 
Joshua Wright, former Federal Trade Commissioner, and Geoffrey 
Manne, Director of the International Center for Law & Economics, have 
made this claim as well. Wright and Manne responded to a Wall Street 
Journal column that had claimed Internet monopolies may harm consumers: 
“[I]t’s really hard to see the above-marginal-cost pricing in these [online] 
markets. From the point of view of the buyers . . . , these monopolists are 
really pathetic at extracting profits, as most of them give away their products 
for free . . . .”70 Discussing social networking services, Catherine Tucker and 
Alexander Marthews similarly posit that “it is not clear that so far [these 
services’] extraordinary growth has created an antitrust issue. . . . [C]onsumers 
do not pay for using these services on most social networking sites.”71 They 
go on to observe that “users almost always experience social networking 
sites for free.”72 And in the international arena, at least one scholar makes 
the claim that EU competition law does not apply absent prices.73 
Even those who advocate some antitrust oversight of firms offering zero-price 
products have made claims along these lines. Nathan Newman, for example, 
urges antitrust and competition-law oversight of Google, yet states, 
“[H]ere’s the key place to start in understanding proper technology policy 
for Google: there is no market for search engines; there is no market for 
online geolocation mapping software; there is no market for online video. 
Google, by making these products free, has destroyed those markets . . . .”74 
Tying these various entities’ arguments together is a common thread: 
the idea that zero-price products are free to customers. If that premise were 
true, then customers would not exchange anything for zero-price products. 
 
68 Robert H. Bork, Opinion, Antitrust and Google, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 2012, http://articles.chicago 
tribune.com/2012-04-06/opinion/ct-perspec-0405-bork-20120406_1_unpaid-search-results-search-engines-
search-algorithms [http://perma.cc/XRB2-W4JE]. 
69 Id. (emphasis added). 
70 Geoffrey Manne & Joshua Wright, What’s an Internet Monopolist? A Reply to Professor Wu, 
TRUTH ON MKT. (Nov. 22, 2010), http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/11/22/whats-an-internet-
monopolist-a-reply-to-professor-wu/ [http://perma.cc/L4UF-UC7K] (emphasis added). 
71 Catherine Tucker & Alexander Marthews, Social Networks, Advertising, and Antitrust, 19 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1211, 1211 (2012) (emphasis added).  
72 Id. at 1227. 
73 See Ferro, supra note 60, at 11 (“[T]he ‘costs’ of using these services are virtually imperceptible 
to users. They often do not perceive them as cost or remuneration.”). 
74 Nathan Newman, You’re Not Google’s Customer—You’re the Product: Antitrust in a Web 2.0 
World, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 29, 2011, 9:51 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-
newman/youre-not-googles-custome_b_841599.html [http://perma.cc/9B6X-B4ES] (last emphasis added). 
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Without a two-way exchange, the economic gains from trade referred to above 
cannot accrue.75 There is no “trade” or “commerce” under the meaning of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts. As a result, the antitrust laws would not apply. 
C.  A Taxonomy of Costs 
Whether antitrust markets can exist in the absence of positive prices 
depends on whether customers—though they do not exchange money—
exchange something for zero-price goods or services. Put another way, the 
question is whether customers incur the type of costs that double as media 
of exchange. The courts, enforcers, and theorists discussed above summarily 
conclude that customers do not incur such costs.76 Their argument is that 
because zero-price products are “free” to customers, zero-price transactions 
do not qualify as “trade” or “commerce” under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
That conclusion is wrong. Customers in zero-price transactions may 
incur multiple types of costs. As with any other marketplace transactions, 
some of the costs incurred are not tied to exchanges. These costs are 
“non-market-signaling”: they do not necessarily signal the presence of 
“trade” or “commerce” for antitrust purposes. The crucial point is that some 
of the costs incurred are exchanged and play the same role that money plays 
in positive-price markets—these costs are “market-signaling.” 
1.  Non-Market-Signaling Costs 
Some types of costs do not necessarily signal the presence of antitrust 
markets. These costs cannot be the subject of exchanges. Opportunity costs 
are a clear example. Every decision entails opportunity costs—the costs of 
not pursuing the potential alternatives.77 Opportunity costs are unilaterally 
absorbed by the party incurring them; they are not exchanged as part of a 
transaction. A finalized transaction will properly reflect each party’s opportunity 
costs, at least assuming the parties accounted for such costs in bargaining. 
But the lost opportunities are not actually exchanged. Consequently, they do 
not necessarily signal an antitrust market. A professor, sitting alone in her 
office, may decide to devote an hour to scholarship instead of class preparation. 
 
75 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
76 See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
77 See R. H. Coase, Business Organization and the Accountant (“The cost of doing anything 
consists of the receipts which could have been obtained if that particular decision had not been 
taken.”), in L.S.E. ESSAYS ON COST 95, 108 (James M. Buchanan & G. F. Thirlby eds., 1973). 
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She has incurred an opportunity cost (the lost chance to prepare for class) 
but has not engaged in market activity, for there has been no exchange.78 
External costs are another example. External costs are created by one 
individual or firm but borne by a third party.79 Like opportunity costs, they 
can be created unilaterally—every driver who has tossed a piece of garbage 
out a car window has imposed external costs on someone. Again, there has 
been no exchange; there is no “market” comprising this type of behavior.80 
2.  Market-Signaling Costs 
Certain types of costs necessarily signal the presence of “trade” or 
“commerce”—i.e., markets—thereby signaling that antitrust scrutiny may be 
appropriate. What distinguishes these costs from the non-market-signaling 
costs discussed above is that they function as the media of exchange. They 
allow parties to enter into “commercial” transactions seeking “economic 
gain”81 from trade. Market-signaling costs place the attendant behavior 
within the statutory scope of the antitrust laws. 
a.  Exchanged Monetary Costs 
What this Article refers to as “exchanged monetary cost” is the 
quintessential example of a market-signaling cost. “Exchanged monetary 
cost” describes the cost to a trade partner of losing ownership of the money 
that that partner exchanges (i.e., pays) to her counter-partner in return for 
the product she seeks. If a customer surrenders $1 to a merchant in exchange 
for one widget, the exchanged monetary cost incurred by that customer is $1. 
Not all monetary costs are market-signaling. To continue the example, 
suppose the merchant had previously made unrecoverable capital expenditures 
in order to acquire retail space and to advertise its widgets.82 And suppose 
 
78 Opportunity costs also arise in the context of marketplace activity, but they do not arise 
exclusively in that context. 
79 See, e.g., Rune Elvik, The External Costs of Traffic Injury: Definition, Estimation, and Possibilities for 
Internalization, 26 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 719, 719 (1994) (“[E]xternal costs are 
defined as any adverse effects of production or consumption that are not included in the utility 
function of the producer or consumer.” (emphasis omitted)).  
80 As with opportunity costs, external costs may—but do not exclusively—arise in the 
context of marketplace activity. 
81 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
82 See, e.g., John Sutton, Endogenous Sunk Costs and the Structure of Advertising Intensive 
Industries, 33 EUR. ECON. REV. 335, 336-38 (1989) (describing the impact that increased advertising 
expenditures have on a company’s sales). 
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further that the customer must pay for transportation to the widget store.83 
For both the merchant and the customer, these sunk costs are monetary 
costs, and they are related to the ultimate transaction (should one occur). 
But they are not exchanged, so they are not necessarily market-signaling costs. If 
the merchant pays for retail space and advertising, but no customers buy any 
of the merchant’s widgets, there is no “trade,” no “commerce”—no market. 
The same is true if a customer drives to the store but does not ultimately 
make a purchase. It is only the exchanged monetary costs that necessarily signal 
marketplace behavior of the type with which the antitrust laws are concerned. 
b.  Exchanged Information and Attention Costs 
For zero-price markets to fall within the statutory purview of antitrust 
law, customers must incur some type of exchanged—i.e., market-signaling—
costs in order to acquire the products they seek. Exchanged monetary costs 
are the quintessential market-signaling costs, but customers in zero-price 
markets do not incur exchanged monetary costs. To the courts, enforcers, and 
theorists quoted above,84 the analysis stops there. Without prices, there can 
be no antitrust markets, because customers do not exchange anything for “free” 
products.85 Demonstrating that this view is wrong—that zero-price markets are 
markets—requires identifying some costs incurred by zero-price-market 
customers that are structurally analogous to the monetary costs embodied 
by prices. Put another way, it requires identifying “exchanged nonmonetary 
costs.” Zero-price markets feature at least two types of exchanged nonmonetary 
costs: information and attention costs. 
i.  Information Costs 
“Today’s currency is data . . . .”86 
 
83 For a general discussion of sunk costs, see DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: AN 
INTERMEDIATE TEXT (1990). 
84 See supra notes 60–74 and accompanying text. 
85 Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 2, apply a transaction-cost-economics approach to 
conclude that “free” transactions often impose transaction costs (e.g., post-transaction monitoring 
of firms’ behavior regarding personal information) on consumers. Id. at 624-25. The emphasis in 
this Article, however, is on the presence of exchange, which allows a more traditional economic analysis. 
86 Edward Wyatt, Raising the F.T.C.’s Voice, Softly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2014, at B1 (quoting 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairwoman Edith Ramirez); see also Allen P. Grunes & 
Maurice E. Stucke, No Mistake About It: The Important Role of Antitrust in the Era of Big Data, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, Apr. 2015, at 1, 2-3 (quoting Chairwoman Ramirez for a similar point and 
stating that “many online companies have adopted business models that rely on personal data as a 
key input”). 
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Zero-price business models often—particularly often in digital-focused 
industries87—depend heavily on customer information. The very same 
innovations that created the platforms necessary for online commerce also 
created (or drastically enhanced) the ability of firms to gather and transfer 
customer information.88 Information gathering and trading is not unique to 
Internet firms, however. Many brick-and-mortar retailers (e.g., grocery 
stores) also engage in widespread information gathering.89 
In zero-price markets, customer information can serve multiple functions. 
It can inform procompetitive behavior; it can also enable anticompetitive 
exclusionary practices.90 It can be the source of indirect network externalities, 
which in turn can cause a market to tip in favor of a dominant firm.91 And 
information can be a valuable and tradable good: it can be sold to (or used by) 
firms that wish to use it strategically, integrated as an input to production, or used 
to target certain customers with advertisements.92 
But—and this is the crucial point—information can also be surrendered 
(i.e., paid) by customers in exchange for the object sought. What the 
antitrust enterprise has failed to recognize is that information costs may be 
market-signaling. Along with attention costs, discussed below, information 
 
87 See Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet, 161 
U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1678 (2013) (“While customer information is perhaps always valuable for a 
business, it is even more so for digital platforms. There are two main reasons for this: (1) digital 
platforms generally have much greater access than conventional businesses to a broad range of 
information about their consumers, and (2) digital businesses may be better able to process and 
use that data for a variety of purposes.”). 
88 See Jeevan Jaisingh et al., Privacy and Pricing Personal Information, 187 EUR. J. 
OPERATIONAL RES. 857, 857 (2008) (“The technological developments that have made e-commerce 
possible have also enhanced the ability of companies to collect, store, transfer, and analyze vast 
amounts of data, from and about the consumers who visit their store on the World Wide Web.”); 
see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 39 (1999) (“The 
significance of the recent birth of e-commerce is that it takes place on an open, unsecured 
network.”); Roland T. Rust et al., The Customer Economics of Internet Privacy, 30 J. ACAD. 
MARKETING SCI. 455, 456 (2002) (“[W]hile the costs of obtaining and processing information 
about consumers are decreasing with the advances in technology, the value of consumer 
information for businesses has been increasing.”). 
89 See Jaisingh et al., supra note 88, at 858 (describing the methods grocery stores use to 
collect and use a consumer’s information). 
90 See Shelanski, supra note 87, at 1680-81 (“When customer information is a useful input for 
a platform and is not equally available to that platform’s competitors, the informational advantage 
can help to entrench market power.”). 
91 See generally, e.g., Cédric Argenton & Jens Prüfer, Search Engine Competition with Network 
Externalities, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 73 (2012) (arguing that users of Internet search 
engines do not account for the fact that search providers will—by virtue of the use—acquire 
private information that can then be used to increase the quality of future searches, thus creating 
indirect network externalities on the user side of the market). 
92 Shelanski, supra note 87, at 1682. The potential users of such information could include the 
firm that extracted the information in the first place. 
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costs are one of the primary media of exchange that underlie sustainable 
business models featuring products offered at zero prices.93 
Customers frequently surrender information as payment in exchange for 
access to zero-price products like webmail, search, social networking, and 
creative-content services. This personal information serves as a form of 
currency, taking the place of money.94 As FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez 
observed, “Today’s currency is data.”95 As do exchanged monetary costs in 
positive-price markets,96 information costs represent a cost to customers and 
also to the media of exchange allowing the transaction to occur.97 
Firms facilitate voluntary information disclosure by providing incentives 
to customers.98 Where the benefits offered exceed the total costs to the 
customer—including the costs of surrendering the information sought—a 
rational customer will surrender the requested information.99 A majority of 
respondents to a 2014 survey stated that they were “willing to share some 
information about themselves with companies in order to use online 
services for free.”100 Marketplace behavior bears out this survey research: 
“[M]ost consumers have shown that they are willing to release personal 
information if they can profit by doing so.”101 
 
93 See infra subsection II.C.2.b.ii. (identifying attention costs as exchanged nonmonetary costs). 
94 See Cotton Delo, Here’s My Personal Data, Marketers. What Do I Get for It?, ADVERT. AGE 
(Nov. 28, 2011), http://adage.com/article/digital/web-data-startups-bank-consumers-controlling-
data/231208/ [http://perma.cc/SDB5-GKYU] (“In a vast, minimally policed web where people are 
increasingly mindful about whom to trust with their information, personal data is being pointed to 
as the currency of the 21st century.”); see also David Zax, Is Personal Data the New Currency?, MIT 
TECH. REV. (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.com/view/426235/is-personal-data-the-
new-currency/ [http://perma.cc/KNW4-EWEY] (“[Consumers] should control their personal data, 
which is ‘being pointed to as the currency of the 21st century.’”). 
95 Wyatt, supra note 86, at B2. 
96 See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
97 Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 2, at 625 (“To provide . . . information to the firm in 
exchange for a free product or service is to engage in trade, even if the trade occurs without a price.”). 
98 See Ee-Cheah Tam et. al., What Do They Want? Motivating Consumers to Disclose Personal 
Information to Internet Businesses, 23 INT’L CONF. ON INFO. SYSTEMS 11, 12 (2002) (“The ability 
of Internet businesses to address privacy concerns should be critical in their attempts to elicit 
consumer information. However, to facilitate voluntary information disclosure, an equally important 
(but often neglected) issue is the provision of incentives to consumers.”). 
99 See id. (“Studies have shown that when given certain tangible or intangible benefits, 
consumers were willing to . . . allow their personal information to be used by businesses.”). 
100 MARY MADDEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA 38 (2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PI_Public 
PerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf [http://perma.cc/2EFM-VGXP]; see also id. (noting, for example, 
that “55% [of those surveyed] ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that they are willing to share some 
information about [themselves] with companies in order to use online services for free”). 
101 John Hagel III & Jeffrey F. Rayport, The Coming Battle for Customer Information, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1997, at 53, 55. 
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Courts outside the antitrust context have recognized this dynamic. In a 
breach of contract action, the promisee’s surrender of personal information 
can constitute consideration for a promise. In Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel & 
Casino, for instance, Ms. Gottlieb accepted the Tropicana casino’s offer to 
join its “Diamond Club,” which entitled her to “one free spin of the Million 
Dollar Wheel each day.”102 The casino did not charge a fee for Diamond Club 
membership103—i.e., membership was a zero-price product. The application 
process did, however, require applicants to submit their personal information 
to the casino.104 The information was then tied to a Diamond Club card, which 
members swiped before playing casino games.105 “The casino’s marketing 
department . . . use[d] that information to tailor its promotions.”106 Allegedly, 
Ms. Gottlieb then swiped her card and spun the Million Dollar Wheel, 
which landed on the “$1 million grand prize.”107 The casino refused to pay, 
arguing that its promise to do so was not supported by consideration—that 
Ms. Gottlieb did not exchange anything for the promise.108 Rejecting this 
defense, the court observed that 
[b]y . . . allowing [her card] to be swiped into the casino’s machine, [Ms. 
Gottlieb] was permitting the casino to gather information about her 
gambling habits. . . . [T]hese detriments to Ms. Gottlieb were “the requested 
detriment[s] to the promisee induced by the promise” of Tropicana to offer 
her a chance to win $1 million. Tropicana’s motives in offering the promotion 
were “in nowise altruistic.” . . . In short, Ms. Gottlieb provided adequate 
consideration to form a contract with Tropicana.109 
The Gottlieb court rightly recognized that a mutual exchange had taken 
place between Ms. Gottlieb and the casino, such that an enforceable contract 
was formed. The information cost functioned as consideration—it signaled 
the presence of a bargained-for exchange.110 The fact that Ms. Gottlieb 
exchanged her personal information instead of money was of no moment. 
Where a customer voluntarily exchanges personal information for a 
zero-price product, the resulting gains from trade leave both parties better 
 







109 Id. at 329-30 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
110 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 4.2 (6th ed. 2009) 
(stating that where the elements of consideration are present, there is a “‘bargained-for exchange,’ 
a binding transaction”). 
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off. These are the sorts of “economic” gains that accrue only from 
marketplace behavior.111 Transactions where information serves as currency 
are “trade” or “commerce” under the meaning of the antitrust laws.112 And, 
absent some compelling reason to conclude otherwise, the default and 
correct position is that the antitrust laws apply to zero-price markets. 
ii.  Attention Costs 
“If I’m giving you something of value at no cost, I will charge you with your time, 
not your money . . . .”113 
Despite its vital role in the modern marketplace, customer attention remains 
relatively unexamined.114 Customer attention to advertisements has driven much 
of the rise to prominence of zero-price markets.115 This is most obviously the 
case with regard to two-sided, ad-supported products. It is also true of hybrid 
business models; the zero-price version of the product in such markets includes 
advertisements, and paid versions often also include (relatively fewer) 
advertisements.116 Additionally, freemium (and complementary-goods) 
business models often also rely on internal advertisements (i.e., advertisements 
featuring products offered by the supplier itself).117 When they appeared, 
freemium services represented an advance over take-it-or-leave-it products 
that forced consumers into a Hobson’s choice: either use the service and view 
the advertisements or do not use the service at all.118 Freemium offers a more 
 
111 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
112 See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
113 Saul Hansell, Web Site Ads, Holding Sway, Start to Blare, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2001, at A1 
(quoting Scott Kurnit, then-Chief Internet Officer of Primedia). 
114 See Tom Chatfield, The Attention Economy, AEON (Oct. 7, 2013), http://aeon.co/magazine/ 
world-views/does-each-click-of-attention-cost-a-bit-of-ourselves/ [http://perma.cc/48BD-WVT3] (“For 
all the sophistication of a world in which most of our waking hours are spent consuming or 
interacting with media, we have scarcely advanced in our understanding of what attention means.”). 
115 See, e.g., Han, supra note 23 (“These two-sided platforms are becoming the major business 
strategy in the mobile app market.”). 
116 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
117 In freemium and complementary-goods contexts, profits may depend on using the zero-price 
product to increase sales of the positive-price product. Firms need to somehow make their zero-price 
customers aware of the latter. The advertisements firms use to do this may be less overt than the 
third-party ads featured in many two-sided platform or freemium markets—but they are 
advertisements, nonetheless. 
118 See Brad J. Sagarin et al., Bartering Our Attention: The Distraction and Persuasion Effects of 
On-Line Advertisements, COGNITIVE TECH., Fall 2003, at 4, 4 (“Traditional ad-sponsored media 
provide consumers with two options: attend to the content and accept the advertisements, or 
reject the content and avoid the advertisements. However, recent technological advances have 
enabled marketers to offer consumers more sophisticated choices.”). 
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sophisticated choice: “[C]onsumers can make individual decisions to pay money 
for a product or service or to barter their attention for an ad-sponsored version.”119 
To customers, advertisements carry both costs and (potentially) benefits. 
The putative benefits can arise where advertising conveys product information 
that is helpful in making consumption decisions.120 (Critics of advertising 
paint a different picture, arguing that advertising seeks to persuade, not inform, 
and that it changes consumer preferences in suboptimal ways.121) The costs 
arise because “advertisements take time” to watch, view, or hear.122 For the 
customers they target, advertisements are a “nuisance.”123 The attention 
expended in order to obtain the desired product is incurred as a cost—an 
“attention cost.” 
Advertisements may be unsolicited. Though exact definitions vary, 
advertisements are generally considered “unsolicited” where they are transmitted 
to a person without that person’s invitation or permission.124 Common examples 
include email spam, junk faxes, and telemarketing calls.125 Attention costs paid 
to unsolicited advertisements are often extremely frustrating to their targets, 
who perceive that they have not obtained anything of value in exchange for their 
expenditure.126 Unsolicited advertisements impose costs but often yield no (or 
incommensurate) benefits.127 Though less offensive than the examples given 
above, advertisements that are “given away, as those in . . . billboard 
advertisements”128 may also be considered unsolicited for present purposes. 
As to unsolicited advertisements, attention costs are non-market-signaling. 
The individuals who incur the costs are not exchanging their attention for 
something of value. Without an exchange, there cannot accrue economic 
gains from trade.129 Consequently, for purposes of the antitrust laws, these 
 
119 Id. 
120 See, e.g., Simon P. Anderson & Stephen Coate, Market Provision of Public Goods: The Case 
of Broadcasting 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7513, 2000) (“The benefits 
are that advertising allows producers to inform consumers about new products, facilitating the 
consummation of mutually beneficial trades.”). 
121 Id. at 3 n.3 (“Under this persuasive view, advertisements can directly alter consumers’ 
tastes for a product.”). 
122 Id. at 1. 
123 Id. at 3. 
124 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4) (2012) (defining “telephone solicitation” to exclude calls or 
messages to any person made following that person’s “prior express invitation or permission”). 
125 Dannielle Cisneros, Do Not Advertise: The Current Fight Against Unsolicited Advertisements, 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV., Apr. 2003, at 1, 4-6. 
126 Congress, perceiving this frustration on the part of email users, reacted by passing the 
CAN-SPAM Act, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7702–7713 (2012)). 
127 See Cisneros, supra note 125, at 2-3 (noting common consumer complaints). 
128 Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory of Advertising as a Good or Bad, 108 
Q.J. ECON. 941, 942 (1993). 
129 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.  
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cost expenditures do not imply “trade” or “commerce.”130 This is not to say 
that unsolicited advertisements never offer value. A billboard advertisement, 
for example, may provide travelers valuable information, like the location of 
the nearest restaurant. But a traveler does not exchange her attention for a desired 
product. The attention costs expended are not part of a trade or transaction.131 
Advertisements may also, however, be delivered via express or implied 
invitation or permission. Here, customers literally pay attention to obtain the 
product delivered along with the advertisements. “Consumers receive 
desired content (e.g., television programming, Internet web sites) in exchange 
for their attention to advertisements.”132 The attention costs incurred are the 
consideration for the product sought; that product is, in turn, the consideration 
for the attention.133 For example, broadcast television viewers—by virtue of 
choosing to view broadcast television—impliedly give permission to television 
broadcasters to subject the viewers to advertisements. Viewers do so in 
exchange for the content they ultimately desire.134 In fact, one television 
executive went so far as to state, “Your contract with the network when you 
get the show is you’re going to watch the [advertising] spots. Otherwise you 
couldn’t get the show on an ad-supported basis. Any time you skip a 
commercial . . . you’re actually stealing the programming.”135 
Here again, courts outside the antitrust context have recognized this 
market dynamic. Jennings v. Radio Station KSCS, 96.3 FM, Inc.,136 provides 
an example. In Jennings, Steve Jennings, a prisoner in Texas, faithfully 
listened to radio station KSCS, which promised on-air to “play at least 
three-in-a-row, or we pay you $25,000.”137 Jennings alleged that KSCS then 
repeatedly played only two songs in a row and that he had unsuccessfully 
 
130 See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
131 Becker and Murphy seem to recognize this point, though their choice of terminology is 
somewhat unusual. They state that “[a]ds may be given away . . . , or they may be sold jointly with 
programs, newspaper articles, comics, sports pages, etc.” Becker & Murphy, supra note 128, at 942. 
132 Sagarin, supra note 118, at 4; cf. Chatfield, supra note 114 (“If you’re using a free online 
service, the adage goes, you are the product.”). 
133 See Matti Leppäniemi & Heikki Karjaluoto, Factors Influencing Consumers’ Willingness to 
Accept Mobile Advertising: A Conceptual Model, 3 INT’L J. MOBILE COMM. 197, 207 (2005) 
(describing the Mobile Marketing Association’s Code of Conduct for mobile advertisers, which, 
under the item “Consideration,” requires that “consumers . . . perceive value in any mobile 
marketing campaign”); see also Chatfield, supra note 114 (“We are all amateur attention economists, 
hoarding and bartering our moments—or watching them slip away down the cracks of a thousand 
YouTube clips.”). 
134 See generally Anderson & Coate, supra note 120 (developing a model of broadcast markets 
that accounts for the “nuisance costs” to consumers created by advertisements). 
135 Sagarin et al., supra note 118, at 4 (alterations in original). 
136 708 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App. 1986). 
137 Id. at 61. 
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demanded the promised $25,000.138 KSCS raised a defense similar to the 
casino’s in Gottlieb: because Jennings had not paid anything for access to 
radio programming, no consideration supported the station’s promise to pay 
$25,000.139 The Jennings court rejected the argument, recognizing that 
Jennings “could have listened to any station, but he listened to KSCS.”140 
KSCS, in turn, had benefited from its promise by gaining new listeners, 
including Jennings.141 Attention costs signaled the presence of an exchange—
they served as consideration to uphold the bargain between the prisoner and 
the radio station.142 
For consumers in many zero-price markets, money is replaced by 
attention—these consumers literally pay attention. Where advertisements are 
solicited, consumers exchange their attention to advertisements for 
corresponding products.143 And because such attention costs are also the 
media of exchange, such transactions allow for economic gains from trade.144 
These attention costs are market-signaling. Transactions where attention serves 
as currency are “trade” or “commerce” under the meaning of the antitrust laws.145 
c.  Zero-Price Products Are Not “Free” 
Zero-price markets are “markets” for purposes of the antitrust laws. 
Though no price is attached to products distributed in zero-price markets, 
they are not “free” to customers.146 There are always costs. Though the 
Internet lowered distribution costs for many products, for-profit firms must 
still recoup their production costs (as well as any distribution costs that 
remain).147 Firms do so by imposing costs on customers. And some of the 




140 Id. at 61-62. 
141 Id. at 62. 
142 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
143 Cf., e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The ‘545 
patent claims a method for distributing copyrighted products (e.g., songs, movies, books) over the 
Internet where the consumer receives a copyrighted product for free in exchange for viewing an 
advertisement . . . .”). 
144 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
146 Professor Friedman recognizes a somewhat similar point in the context of advertisements 
featuring “free offers.” See David Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 N.M. L. REV. 49, 
49 (2008) (“Free offers exist to lure potential customers to a specific offering, to bring them to the 
commercial enterprise where an offering can be presented, or to create an often-hidden psychological 
tie between customers and the enterprise that helps induce a sale.”). 
147 See Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 2, at 622 (“Distribution costs for most online 
products may appear low but production costs are and will remain high.”). 
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cost to customers and the consideration exchanged to suppliers. That 
attention and information costs can be exchanged is a point missed by those 
who dismiss zero-price products as “free.” The transactions made possible 
by the exchange of attention and information allow economic gains from 
trade. For purposes of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, these exchanges can 
in the aggregate qualify as “trade” or “commerce.”148 
Concluding that the scope of antitrust law does not extend to zero-price 
markets is mistaken.149 In part, the errors made by the Kinderstart.com and 
Stephen Jay courts resulted from a misguided focus on the term “sales” in 
defining relevant markets. The Kinderstart.com court, for example, observed 
that the plaintiff “failed to allege . . . a ‘grouping of sales.’”150 This language—
“grouping of sales”—is not found in the statutory language of the antitrust 
laws. Using “grouping of sales” as a standard may be appropriate in markets 
that feature positive prices, but it is misleading in zero-price contexts 
because of the pecuniary connotations of “sales.” The proper focus is on 
whether the defendant is involved in “trade” or “commerce.”151 As the 
discussion above shows, zero-price products can satisfy this statutory standard.152 
The more fundamental error, however, is made by those who observe 
that zero-price products are necessarily “free” and conclude that antitrust 
law does not apply to their suppliers. In common usage, “free” means 
“[c]osting nothing.”153 Overlooking the costs that customers often pay in 
exchange for zero-price products translates into bad antitrust policy by 
ignoring an increasingly vital sector of modern economies. Rational, for-profit 
firms offer products at zero prices because they have determined that doing 
so is profitable. Customers, having determined that the benefits outweigh 
the costs, enter into contracts to acquire those products from suppliers. This 
give-and-take is the very essence of the “trade” and “commerce” contemplated 
by the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
Zero-price markets present opportunities for the creation, enhancement, 
or abuse of market power—precisely the evils that antitrust laws are intended 
to remedy. That customers pay for zero-price products with information and 
 
148 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
149 Evans agrees, speculating that some defendants may have declined to pursue this claim 
because no reputable economic expert would advocate for it. Evans, Antitrust Economics, supra note 1, at 72. 
150 Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF(RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007). 
151 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra Part II. 
153 Free, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 542 (3d ed. 1993); see also 
LESSIG, supra note 8, at 12 (“A resource is ‘free’ if (1) one can use it without the permission of 
anyone else; or (2) the permission one needs is granted neutrally.”). 
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attention rather than money is irrelevant here: “The antitrust laws are 
concerned with maintaining competition in private markets.”154 Conduct 
that raises costs or restricts output of zero-price products can harm welfare just 
as seriously as conduct that raises price or reduces output in other markets. 
III.  THE FUNCTION OF ZERO-PRICE MARKETS 
Under the consensus view, modern antitrust law takes as its goal the 
protection and promotion of competition in private markets.155 In a 
perfectly competitive market, strategic behavior that harms the competitive 
process and consumers will be disciplined by market forces more efficiently 
than by government intervention. It follows that, if markets are perfectly 
competitive, antitrust laws have no role to play. Even if the statutorily 
defined scope of the antitrust laws encompasses zero-price markets, 
regulatory market intervention is not necessarily appropriate. 
Of course, no market in the real world achieves the idealized model of 
perfect competition. The degree to which zero-price markets approach—or 
deviate from—that ideal can, however, inform the role antitrust should play 
in such markets. Do firms actually compete in zero-price markets? Can 
market power be anticompetitively attained, exercised, or maintained? If so, 
how is society harmed? And how did antitrust institutions fail to account for 
the possibility of such harm? 
A.  The Presence of Competition 
Buyer–seller exchanges in zero-price markets are structurally similar to 
those in markets with positive prices. Rational firms find it profitable to 
exchange zero-price products to customers in exchange for their attention or 
information. Just as in markets with positive prices, one would expect the 
presence of competition in zero-price markets. Absent competition, an 
individual supplier (or oligopoly or cartel) would be able to exact inefficiently 
high information or attention costs, reducing output—just as a monopolist 
in a positive-price market can set prices at the monopoly level, reducing 
output and creating a deadweight loss.156 The presence of monopoly profits 
 
154 HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 13. 
155 Id. at 13-15.  
156 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY, AND PROCEDURE: 
CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 50 (7th ed. 2014) (“The monopolist faces a downward sloping 
demand curve, which indicates that it can charge more by reducing output.”). 
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may attract entry by competitors.157 Actual or threatened customer 
substitution in favor of competitors’ products will spur a monopolist to 
lower costs and increase quality—in short, to compete.158 
Unsurprisingly, customers of zero-price products make substitution 
decisions based in part on attention or information costs.159 The same 
substitution effect observed in positive-price markets (or the threat of it) 
spurs firms to compete for business in ways that benefit customers. Broadcast 
radio markets provide one compelling example of reduced competition leading 
to higher attention costs imposed on listeners.160 Empirical analysis of 
programming conducted in the wake of deregulation shows that the advertising 
time increases as firm size increases (i.e., as market concentration increases);161 
tellingly, the amount of time devoted to advertisements increases most 
sharply during times of the day when listeners have fewer ready substitutes.162 
This substitution strongly suggests that, where possible, customers will 
substitute away from products that entail overly high attention costs. Reducing 
the number of competitors in the market limits customers’ ability to do so. 
Information costs provide a similar avenue for competition: multiple 
firms have launched search engines that differentiate themselves primarily on 
the basis of low information costs.163 These entrants enjoyed rapid 
growth,164 though their long-term viability is uncertain. Firms in zero-price 
 
157 See WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, MICROECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 
229 (9th ed. 2012) (“Low barriers to entry in monopolistic competition mean that short-run 
economic profit attracts new entrants in the long run.”). 
158 See id. (noting that where entry is easy, “monopolistically competitive firms earn zero 
economic profit in the long run” (emphasis omitted)). 
159 They also consider—perhaps even primarily—attributes like quality. See Maurice E. 
Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, When Competition Fails to Optimise Quality: A Look at Search Engines 2 
(Univ. of Tenn. Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 268, 2015) 
(“By and large, when a product or service is offered for free, the primary dimension of competition is 
typically quality.”). 
160 See infra Section III.C. 
161 See generally, e.g., Catherine Tyler Mooney, Market Power and Audience Segmentation 
Drive Radio Advertising Levels (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-
bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=IIOC2010&paper_id=203 [https://perma.cc/YF98-TDGG]. 
162 Id. at 5. 
163 See Andrew Lazaunikas, Duck Duck Go’s Impact on the Current SEO Landscape and Its Future 
Trajectory, SEARCH ENGINE JOURNAL (July 29, 2013), http://www.searchenginejournal.com/duck-duck-
gos-impact-on-the-current-seo-landscape-and-its-future-trajectory/65446/ [http://perma.cc/HGS5-ALR4] (“Google, 
Yahoo and Bing have seen a small subset of the market diverge to other search engines with 
stricter privacy policies.”). 
164 E.g., DuckDuckGo Direct Queries Per Day (1y Avg), DUCKDUCKGO, https://duckduckgo.com/ 
traffic.html [https://perma.cc/Y5LG-JSPD] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (showing that DuckDuckGo 
received approximately 4.8 million direct queries per day in August 2014 and 9.5 million direct 
queries per day in August 2015). 
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markets compete along multiple dimensions, including the information and 
attention costs they impose on customers. 
In light of the foregoing, it would be a mistake to conceive of zero-price 
markets as essentially a single, competitive market where consumer-facing 
differentiation is important only insofar as it allows platforms to deliver a 
differentiated type of consumer to advertisers or data-seekers. Evans, in 
analyzing attention rivalry, takes this approach by arguing that “attention 
seekers compete for procuring attention regardless of the products and 
services they offer for doing this.”165 Under this conception, social media 
platforms, search engines, news websites, and online shopping portals are all 
locked in intense competition with each other for a scarce resource: users’ 
attention. Unsurprisingly, “attention seekers are price takers in terms of 
what they pay to secure attention.”166 
This conception overlooks the exchange aspect of zero-price markets 
discussed above. The error can be seen by transporting the analysis to the 
more familiar positive-price context. Automobile dealers, restaurants, clothing 
stores, and movie theaters are all locked in intense competition with each 
other for a scarce resource: consumer money. But that sort of competition 
does not give rise to a “strong presumption” that all “attention seekers” “are 
price takers.”167 Evans uses the example of the social networking site 
Pinterest to illustrate that the rise in popularity of one online platform 
necessarily diverts attention from other platforms, regardless of their content.168 
But a similar argument can be made about any innovative new entrant; sales 
of a new product will almost always reduce sales of other products.169 It is the 
closeness of substitutability that matters for antitrust analysis. Thus, for example, 
“when the automobile was first invented, competing auto manufacturers 
obviously took customers primarily from companies selling horses and 
buggies . . . , but that hardly shows that cars and horse-drawn carriages should 
be treated as the same product market.”170 
 
165 Evans, Attention Rivalry, supra note 18, at 316. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 See id. at 317 (“People only have so much time. . . . To participate in this new pinning site 
they either spent more time online or shifted their time from other things they were doing online.”). 
169 It is possible that the attractiveness of the new product will attract buyers who had 
previously been unwilling to spend on any available products. 
170 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Tatel, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
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B.  The Role and Efficacy of Competition 
The proper role of competition in a modern market economy is to act as 
a private check on self-interested economic behavior.171 This function leaves 
all of society better off by increasing consumer welfare, maximizing efficiency 
and productivity, and spurring innovation, among other benefits.172 Seeking 
to increase sales and profits, firms are driven by their competitors to increase 
quality, lower costs and prices, or create entirely new and better products. 
Where the primary costs to customers are exchanged monetary costs, 
competition ensures that the buyer can choose the best possible product in 
exchange for the minimum possible amount of money.173 This role is vital to 
the very pillars of a market economy: “The main claims for a private-
enterprise system rest upon the workings of competition . . . .”174 
In zero-price markets, competition should ensure that customers receive 
the best possible zero-price products while minimizing the attention and 
information costs those customers must exchange for the products. How 
well competition serves that goal is relevant to antitrust law’s role and stance. 
In the early twentieth century, economists arrived at what, more or less, 
remains the modern conception of the requirements for a market to be 
perfectly competitive. These conditions include, but are certainly not 
limited to, perfect rationality, perfect knowledge, zero transaction costs, low 
entry and exit barriers, many producers, and commoditized products.175 
Where these conditions are met, prices are driven down to the marginal cost 
of production, and firms are driven to minimize their costs.176 
 
171 For a basic overview, see The Economic Lowdown Podcast Series: The Role of Self-Interest and 
Competition in a Market Economy, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, http://www.stlouisfed.org/education_ 
resources/economic-lowdown-podcast-series/the-role-of-self-interest-and-competition/ [http://perma 
.cc/9WU3-KCGT] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
172 For an explanation of these dynamics, see William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the TokyoAmerica Center: The Role of 
Competition in Promoting Dynamic Markets and Economic Growth (Nov. 12, 2002), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200484.pdf [http://perma.cc/QS2W-QGDE]. 
173 In the long run, competition may also reduce transaction and other costs. 
174 George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J. POL. ECON. 1, 4 (1957). 
175 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 51-93 (1921). Knight assumed 
lack of collusion and monopoly instead of “many producers,” id. at 78, which has subsequently 
become the more generally accepted assumption.  
176 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 
IOWA L. REV. 1019, 1025 (1989) (“Within the modern neoclassical model, ‘perfect competition’ 
describes a state of affairs in which price is driven to marginal cost and firms are forced to 
minimize their costs through innovation and growth to the optimal size.”). 
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1.  Structural Deviations from Perfect Competition 
Structurally, a perfectly competitive market features homogeneous 
products, low barriers to entry and exit, sufficient competitors (or rapid 
entrants), and perfect knowledge on the part of suppliers and customers. 
Zero-price markets often deviate from these assumptions, creating the 
potential for the creation, acquisition, exercise, or maintenance of market power.  
Zero-price markets are relatively heterogeneous. Early antitrust enforcers 
targeted commoditized lines of commerce like steel, tobacco, oil, and aluminum.177 
This focus is unsurprising, given that such markets once dominated the 
broader economy.178 The products offered by zero-price market participants, by 
comparison, tend to be differentiated—and often highly so.179 
It is commonplace but misguided to claim that Internet-based markets, 
many of which feature zero prices, uniformly exhibit low entry barriers.180 
As in other contexts, the type and magnitude of entry barriers in zero-price 
markets vary widely across different individual markets. On one end of the 
spectrum lie products like simple mobile applications (apps), many of which 
are distributed at zero prices.181 Barriers to entry may consist of only a few 
thousand dollars and a small amount of time.182 At the other end of the 
spectrum are more complex products that require years of time, considerable 
expertise, and millions of dollars to launch.183 The barriers to launching a 
 
177 Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design, supra note 29, at 687; see also Richard A. Posner, 
Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 926 (2001) [hereinafter Posner, New 
Economy] (listing “steel, automobiles, pipe, wire, aluminum, railroad cars, roadbuilding materials, 
and cigarettes” as the industries from which modern antitrust analysis arose). 
178 See, e.g., Posner, New Economy, supra note 177, at 925 (referring to traditional markets as 
“smokestack industries”). 
179 See, e.g., Kaifu Zhang & Miklos Sarvary, Social Media Competition: Differentiation with 
User-Generated Content 3 (Sept. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://marketing.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
mktg/assets/File/Social%20Media_Kaifu%20Zhang.pdf [https://perma.cc/SWQ9-C9DW] (pointing to 
Facebook and MySpace as examples of differentiated social networks). 
180 See, e.g., JOHN GALLAUGHER, GETTING THE MOST OUT OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS: 
A MANAGER’S GUIDE TO HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY ch. 2.3 (1st ed. 2009) (ebook) (“Some 
have correctly argued that the barriers to entry for many tech-centric businesses are low. This 
argument is particularly true for the Internet where rivals can put up a competing Web site 
seemingly overnight.”); Barriers to Entry, Exit and Mobility, ECONOMIST (July 13, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/14025576 [http://perma.cc/FLK2-KD39] (“Old ideas about barriers to 
entry were given a new twist with the development of e-commerce. By using the internet, firms 
can sometimes surmount traditional barriers with an ease not previously available.”). 
181 Cf. Thomas Carter, How Much Does It Cost to Develop an App?, BLUECLOUDSOLUTIONS, 
http://www.bluecloudsolutions.com/blog/cost-develop-app/ [http://perma.cc/9ATT-85DZ] (last updated 
Mar. 25, 2015) (noting that some simple apps can be developed for as low as $1000). 
182 See id. (estimating that simple mobile apps cost between $1000 and $4000 to develop). 
183 For example, consider comprehensive mapping systems like Google Maps. Over a period 
of years, Google developed Maps by compiling mapping data and satellite imagery, constructing 
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rival product are quite high, even if the market price for such products is set 
at zero. 
Perfectly informed customers seeking to buy a product from firms 
operating in a perfectly competitive market act as a very effective check on 
firms’ behavior. If a single firm were to attempt to raise prices above the 
market-clearing level, customers—perceiving the cost of that firm’s product 
to be higher than the costs of competing products, with no corresponding 
increase in benefits—would simply buy from competitors.184 This 
substitution would cause the price-increasing firm to forgo the potential 
profits from the lost sales, thereby disciplining its attempted price increase.185 
Customers thus restrain such decisions, ensuring that firms are (at least in 
part) incentivized to choose pro-customer strategies. This function requires 
that customers be able to assess and compare the relative costs and benefits 
of the products in the market. 
Comparing costs in many positive-price markets is a straightforward 
exercise. In zero-price markets, however, it is no small task. Without a 
perfectly fungible baseline of comparison like currency, customers are left to 
make qualitative judgments about which product will cost the least amount 
of information and attention. Price information is quantitative, simple, and 
almost costless to gather. Nonprice cost information is qualitative, complex, 
and relatively costly to gather. To illustrate, assume that two zero-price 
services, Service A and Service B, compete in the same relevant antitrust 
market, and that attention costs can be measured in units called “attens.” A 
and B are differentiated, but they feature the exact same advertisements in 
the same format, with each extracting ten attens per consumer. Even though 
the two services extract the same attention costs, that fact would not be 
readily apparent to consumers—there is no analogue to a “price tag” for 
attention (or information) costs.  
In fact, customers typically must first experience relevant zero-price 
products to make even a qualitative assessment of the relative costs.186 This 
 
specially outfitted camera cars, collecting over 20 petabytes (21.5 billion megabytes) of street-view 
imagery, integrating ratings software, and spending untold millions on building out and 
maintaining the infrastructure necessary to deliver the service to fixed and mobile computing 
devices. Leo Kelion, Google Maps Uses Ground Truth Project to Battle Apple, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 
2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19536269 [http://perma.cc/AS9S-ACNR]. 
184 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 156, at 38-39 (describing the horizontal demand curve 
faced by a single competitor in an undifferentiated market). 
185 Id. 
186 See Shelanski, supra note 87, at 1691 (“Digital platform services are largely ‘experience’ 
goods, the qualities and characteristics of which are difficult to assess in advance but relatively easy 
to judge upon actual use.” (citing Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. 
ECON. 311, 313-14 (1970))). 
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“experience requirement” introduces the possibility that path dependence, 
rather than inherent product qualities, will drive the direction of markets.187 
That, in turn, at least arguably increases the likelihood of suboptimal 
outcomes.188 At a minimum, the experience requirement increases the costs 
to consumers of calculating the costs of the relevant products. Perhaps as a 
result, customers may simply remain entirely ignorant of information costs. 
When consumers choose Internet-based products, Shelanski observes that 
their “failure to read or understand privacy policies remains a possible 
source of market failure.”189 Reading and understanding the privacy policies 
of competing suppliers is an incredibly difficult task for those few customers 
who actually undertake it. Even many attorneys well-versed in contract law 
would be unable ex ante to draw any meaningful conclusions regarding 
relative information costs.190  
Perhaps most important, though, is the fact that not only the relevant 
products, but also the costs themselves, are generally differentiated. The 
example above is highly stylized—in reality, A and B will nearly always 
feature different advertisements in different formats. As a consequence, the 
relative costs will be differentiated in a way that prices cannot be. The 
significance of attention costs varies from advertisement to advertisement, 
with some particularly high-quality advertisements imposing net negative 
costs (i.e., benefits).191 Costs also vary according to the format of the 
 
187 See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC 
GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 11 (1999) (“[U]sers of information technologies are 
notoriously subject to switching costs and lock-in: once you have chosen a technology, or a format 
for keeping information, switching can be very expensive.”). One commonly used example of an 
outcome due to path dependence is the standardization of railroad track width around the globe. 
Adoption of 1.435 meters as the standard width between rails is the result of little more than 
historical accident. See Douglas J. Puffert, The Standardization of Track Gauge on North American 
Railways, 1830-1890, 60 J. ECON. HIST. 933, 956 (2000) (“[I]f a few key early [1.435-meter] lines 
had chosen a different gauge instead, then there could have been much more diversity—and 
conceivably a different continental standard.”). Puffert observes that “most (but not all) railway 
engineers today would find a broader gauge technically and economically superior, although only 
to a small extent.” Id. at 934. 
188 See generally Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 2, at 642-43 (“The concept of lock-in is 
well understood in the industry of online products, and it dates back for several decades.”). But cf. 
S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 205 (1995) (arguing that the two types of path dependence that are commonplace do not 
depart from the standard neoclassical account, and that the third and potentially problematic type 
is rare in practice). 
189 Shelanski, supra note 87, at 1691. 
190 And even a relatively clear policy does not—and cannot—give customers the ability to 
track how information is actually used. 
191 A well-constructed advertisement may create a valuable positive experience, or impart 
valued product information, to consumers. See, e.g., Many Just Watch the Super Bowl for the Ads, 
USA TODAY (Jan. 15, 2014, 3:52 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ad-meter/super-
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advertisement (such as its location and visibility).192 Information costs tend 
to be no less differentiated.193 
Information and attention costs are also differentiated by who bears 
them. Different customers experience viewing advertisements or surrendering 
personal information differently. To use the above example, even if A and B 
featured the same advertisements in the same formats, the actual net cost in 
attens will likely vary consumer-to-consumer. This is so because consumers 
exhibit differing sensitivities to attention and information costs. Consumer 
Y may experience surrendering personal information (say, Internet search 
history) very differently than Consumer Z.194 To some consumers, or with 
regards to some advertisements, attention costs related to advertisements 
can be negligible, zero, or even negative. That is, some consumers may perceive 
 
bowl/buzz-meter/2014/01/14/ad-meter-story-this-just-in-people-still-mostly-watch-super-bowl-for-
ads/4458163/ [http://perma.cc/3VSK-V8NF].  
192 Consider a simple example: Farmer A sells his wheat to Elevator X for $8.00 per bushel, 
while Farmer B sells his wheat to Elevator Y for $8.02 per bushel. (Assume that the prices here are 
delivered prices, that is, the farmers foot the bill for transporting the wheat to the elevators.) 
Because currency is fungible, an analyst can state with reasonable confidence that Elevator Y ’s 
wheat costs are $0.02 greater than Elevator X’s costs. Compare this to two hypothetical video-streaming 
services offered to consumers at zero prices. Service A features a lower total number of 
advertisements than Service B, but the average length of A’s ads is greater than that of B’s ads. 
Furthermore, A’s ads are of greater quality (for example, they contain more useful product 
information) but interrupt the viewing experience by occupying the entire user interface; however, 
B’s lower-quality ads take up only a portion of the screen. Even in this simplified hypothetical, the 
problem of comparing costs in such a market is eminently evident. 
193 See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Americans Say They Want Privacy, but Act as if They Don’t, N.Y. 
TIMES: THE UPSHOT, Nov. 12, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/upshot/americans-say-
they-want-privacy-but-act-as-if-they-dont.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/L3CA-MYFS] (discussing the 
results of a Pew Research survey). According to the survey responses, “The types of digital 
information that people consider to be most sensitive are their Social Security numbers, health 
information, the content of emails and phone calls and their location. They are least sensitive 
about their purchasing habits, media consumption, political and religious views, and the identities 
of their friends.” Id.  
194 See, e.g., Patricia A. Norberg et al., The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure 
Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER AFF. 100, 101-02 (2007) (“[P]rivacy perceptions vary 
widely across populations and even within specific segments. A closely guarded secret to one may 
be the chance for an appearance on The Jerry Springer Show for another.” (citations omitted)). But 
see generally Il-Horn Hann et al., Online Information Privacy: Measuring the Cost-Benefit Trade-off, 23 
INT’L CONF. ON INFO. SYSTEMS 1 (2002) (noting that previous research suggested that individual 
concern over privacy varies depending on cultural values, level of trust, contextual knowledge, and 
gender). Hann et al. surprisingly found that cost–benefit calculations did not vary along those 
lines. Id. at 4-7. A Pew Research Internet Project survey showed that “[p]eople with more 
education and higher incomes tend to be more sensitive about their online privacy . . . . And 
despite perceptions that young people care little about digital privacy, they often care more than 
older people.” Miller, supra note 193. 
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some advertisements as an added value.195 Accurately assessing costs imposed 
by advertisements is no small task. 
These complexities make the assumption of perfect information particularly 
unfit for application to behavior in zero-price markets. Problems acquiring 
information, coupled with the structural issues noted above,196 indicate that, 
like all markets, zero-price markets deviate in important ways from the idealized 
model of perfect competition. These deviations carry implications for the design 
and implementation of antitrust analysis. 
2.  Behavioral Deviations 
Modern antitrust analysts have begun to grapple with whether and how 
to incorporate findings from behavioral economics. Some theorists’ dissatisfaction 
with neoclassical economics’ permeation of antitrust policy has spurred a 
search for new paradigms. Among the candidates is the field of behavioral 
economics: “[A] body of evidence in laboratory and field experiments that 
suggests actual individual choices systematically deviate” from what 
neoclassical rational-choice theory would predict.197  
Proponents of “behavioral antitrust” urge that neoclassical assumptions 
about rationality “fail to explain actual market behavior.”198 Basing antitrust 
analysis on insights that depend on these flawed assumptions, this argument 
runs, is misguided. Behavioral economics thus allows more realistic analyses 
of marketplace behavior.199 Critics respond that behavioral antitrust offers 
less explanatory power than traditional models.200 To take entry as one 
example, behavioral antitrust implies that there may either be too much or 
too little—or both too much and too little—entry in response to an 
incumbent monopolist’s high prices.201 Yet it offers no principle for predicting 
 
195 Viewers often voluntarily seek out particularly popular advertisements on video-hosting 
services like YouTube. In 2014, the ten most popular YouTube-hosted advertising spots “earned a 
combined 425 million views and accounted for more than 1 billion total minutes of viewing time 
(that’s about 1,900 years).” Tim Nudd, The 10 Most Watched Ads on YouTube in 2014, ADWEEK, 
(Dec. 9, 2014, 1:34 PM), http://www.adweek.com/news-gallery/advertising-branding/10-most-watched-
ads-youtube-2014-161843 [http://perma.cc/EMX9-6PQT]. 
196 See supra subsection III.B.1. 
197 Joshua D. Wright & Judd E. Stone II, Misbehavioral Economics: The Case Against 
Behavioral Antitrust, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517, 1519 (2012). 
198 Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527, 1585-86 (2011). 
199 See, e.g., id. (“[R]eliance on these rational-choice theories will recede in the coming 
years . . . . Here, the behavioral economics literature . . . will advance competition policy in 
understanding such behavior.”). 
200 See Wright & Stone, supra note 197, at 1523-25 (highlighting several flaws that, according 
to Wright and Stone, limit the theory’s predictive power). 
201 Id. at 1544. 
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ex ante which scenario is more likely to occur. Furthermore, behavioral 
economics research tends to analyze individual human—not firm—behavior, 
calling into question its relevance to general antitrust policy. Its critics also 
observe that, at a minimum, behavioral economics remains too underdeveloped 
for deployment in the field.202 
The following discussion suggests that, within limits, behavioral 
economics can help illuminate zero-price markets in ways that are useful for 
antitrust policy. To the extent possible, it seeks to avoid taking a position in 
the broader debate outlined above (which is admittedly a fine line to walk). 
a.  Not “Just a Number”: Demand and the Zero-Price Effect 
“In terms of competitive demand and supply, or the standard framework for a 
profit-maximizing firm setting price in the face of a downward sloping demand 
schedule, a ‘free price’ simply means that the competitive market or the profit-maximizing 
firm sets a price of zero. Zero is just another number.”203 
Modern antitrust law has held no special regard for zero-price markets. 
Yet an emerging body of behavioral economics research has demonstrated 
that zero prices uniquely influence actual consumer behavior. Though this 
literature is still developing,204 it is robust enough that antitrust analysts 
ought to account for it in enforcement-related and judicial decisionmaking. 
Where consumer behavior does not fit the standard model, the model 
requires alteration. In short, economic models must fit real world facts, 
rather than the other way around. 
Neoclassical economics generally proceeds under the baseline assumption 
of “perfectly rational, utility maximizing, narrowly self-interested” actors.205 A 
rational consumer assesses the costs and benefits of a widget and, so long as 
the benefit of purchasing exceeds the cost, she will purchase the widget. 
And so long as the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost, she will 
continue purchasing incremental units. The perceived benefit will not vary 
 
202 For a thorough analysis from this perspective, see Roger Van den Bergh, Behavioral 
Antitrust: Not Ready for the Main Stage, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 203 (2013).  
203 Evans, supra note 1, at 79. 
204 See, e.g., Ahmed Driouchi et al., How Zero Price Affects Demand?: Experimental Evidence 
from the Moroccan Telecommunications Market 20 (Munich Pers. RePEc Archive, Working Paper No. 
32352, 2011), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32352/1/MPRA_paper_32352.pdf [http://perma.cc/L5FB-
9X4D] (concluding that “the zero-price model remains a complex model, and much additional 
work is needed to understand the complexities of this model in the marketplace”). 
205 Some have dubbed this curious creature “homo economicus,” wryly implying that she does 
not in fact exist outside the abstract world of neoclassical economic theory. See, e.g., Max Huffman, 
Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 115-16 (2012) (describing 
the inception of the behavioral economics movement). 
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with the price. Consider, for example, a consumer who calculates the benefits 
of a widget to be $10. That consumer will value the widget at $10 whether its 
price is set at $5 or $15. If the price is $5, the consumer will purchase; if it is 
$15, she will not.  
In the case of a perfectly rational consumer deciding which of two 
competing products to purchase, a downward shift in the price of one of the 
goods may, all else equal, induce her to purchase that product. So long as 
both prices move downward in tandem, however, there will be no predicted 
substitution effect. To illustrate, assume the consumer values widget A at $6 
and widget B at $16. Assume further that A is priced at $5 and B at $15. So 
long as the price of A is $5 and the price of B is $15, she will be indifferent as 
to the choice between the two: each will yield $1 of consumer surplus. If the 
price of A is lowered to $4 while the price of B remains $15, she will choose 
A—it will now yield twice the surplus as would choosing B. But if the price 
of A is lowered to $4 while the price of B is lowered to $14, the consumer 
should remain indifferent (though undoubtedly happier to have reaped an 
additional $1 of welfare surplus). This dynamic should remain constant even 
if the price of A were lowered all the way to $0, so long as the price of B 
were lowered a corresponding amount.206 Under the standard account, when 
it comes to prices, “[z]ero is just another number”207 (albeit one that should 
indicate nontraditional market features, such as two-sidedness, are at play208). 
This standard account, however, ignores one very important factor: the 
singular effect of zero prices. Recent behavioral economics research has 
demonstrated that when consumers are faced with a choice between a zero-priced 
option and a positively priced option, “the demand for the cheaper good 
increases, and more importantly, the demand for the more expensive good 
may decrease as consumers switch from the more expensive good to the 
cheaper one.”209 This effect holds true even where a standard cost–benefit 
 
206 Setting aside for the moment the possibility of transaction costs affecting the decision, a 
possibility that is discussed further infra. 
207 Evans, Antitrust Economics, supra note 1, at 79. 
208 Id. at 86. 
209 Kristina Shampanier et al., Zero as a Special Price: The True Value of Free Products, 26 
MARKETING SCI. 742, 745 (2007). The basic structure of the experiments that first confirmed the 
existence of the zero-price effect involved, as in the example used above, two different sets of 
prices for the same two competing products. The first pairing of prices offered to consumers 
generally consisted of two positive prices (e.g., $0.01 for one product and $0.15 for the other). The 
researchers then offered the same goods to consumers with the second set of prices, this time 
establishing one positive price and one zero price (e.g., $0 for the product previously offered at 
$0.01 and $0.14 for the product previously offered at $0.15). 
  
2015] Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations 185 
 
analysis, or even an alternative “ratio-based” cost–benefit analysis, would 
seem to favor choosing the positively priced product.210 
To the businessperson, this market behavior likely seems unsurprising,211 
but to a neoclassical economist, it presents a puzzle. The initial objection 
would likely be that transaction costs may explain consumers’ seemingly 
irrational predilection for zero-price goods. One could argue that consumers 
may lopsidedly favor zero-price goods because zero-price transactions entail 
lower transaction costs. Transaction costs are, as their name suggests, simply 
the costs of conducting a transaction: the time and effort expended by each 
party required in order to consummate it. Because no money need change 
hands in transactions involving zero-price products—the consumer need not 
carry and produce cash or another payment form, the cashier need not make 
change or wait for a card authorization, and so on—such trades would 
generally entail lower transaction costs than similar transactions involving 
positively priced products.  
Yet existing research has shown that transaction costs (or the near-total 
lack thereof) do not explain away the zero-price effect.212 Rather, the 
positive affect associated with engaging in zero-price transactions triggers 
an outsized increase in valuation and demand, as indicated by consumers’ 
revealed preferences.213 Researchers have dubbed this the “zero-price effect.”214 
 
210 Id. at 747 (“[T]he results . . . demonstrate that valuations of free goods increase beyond 
their cost-benefit differences . . . .”). 
211 Zero prices to consumers is attractive in myriad business settings. For example, consider 
AT&T’s entry into the issuing side of the general purpose credit card market in 1990. AT&T’s 
“Universal Card” was the first widely available, general-purpose card to offer a $0 annual fee, 
essentially offering consumers access to a zero-price credit card for the first time. Dennis W. 
Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, The Antitrust Economics of Credit Card Networks, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 
643, 653 (1995). This feature proved so popular that, in the upheaval following AT&T’s entry, 
“over 400 other issuers began selectively waiving their own annual fees to keep customers from 
defecting to AT&T.” Id. 
212 Shampanier et al. conducted a series of additional experiments that ruled out mapping 
difficulty (i.e., the possibility that consumers prefer zero-price options due to an inability to 
evaluate the utility of hedonic goods) and (under at least some conditions) social norms as 
potential explanations. Shampanier et al., supra note 209, at 749-51. 
213 Interestingly, this positive effect does not necessarily occur in consumers faced with zero-value, 
nonprice product attributes. In fact, where consumers are faced with at least two options, the shift 
from a positive-value attribute to a zero-value attribute can actually cause consumers to prefer the 
option with the positive-value (nonprice) attribute—essentially the inverse of the zero-price effect. 
This function holds true even where the relevant attribute is objectively undesirable. See generally 
Mauricio M. Palmeira, The Zero-Comparison Effect, 38 J. CONSUMER RES. 16 (2011) (arguing that 
this function may be explained by the removal of a positive value eliminating a useful reference 
point for consumers, thereby causing a “zero-comparison” effect). 
214 DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE 
OUR DECISIONS 55-72 (2008). 
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b.  Systematic Overconsumption 
Consumers’ skewed preference for zero-price products can cause them 
to engage in behavior that appears to be wasteful or inefficient. Individuals 
may overconsume or even hoard resources available to them at a price of 
zero.215 Such behavior may be particularly likely to occur where individuals 
are able to externalize some or all of the costs of such behavior. 
For example, transportation economists studying drivers’ use of public 
roads have long recognized that, absent any “road pricing” (e.g., tolls 
charged to access heavily used motorways at peak traffic times), drivers will 
tend to overuse roads, causing traffic congestion to rise above efficient 
levels.216 Similarly, researchers contend that “serious economic inefficiencies,” 
including congestion, can occur where prices to access airport slots are not 
set at cost by market forces.217 Health economists studying the modern 
obesity epidemic point out that consumers have increasingly engaged in 
systematic caloric overconsumption during the past four decades.218 It is 
theorized that this trend is due, at least in part, to health insurance and 
governmental programs now allowing individuals to externalize much of the 
cost of being obese (though not, in most cases, the cost of becoming obese, 
since most food is obtained via positive-price transactions). In a sense, the 
condition becomes “free” to the consumer, though it remains costly to society.219 
 
215 See, e.g., Benjamin Edelman, Priced and Unpriced Online Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 21, 
21-22 (2009) (“[O]verconsumption, scarcity, and even hoarding [can occur] when resources are 
provided without charge.”). 
216 See, e.g., A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 186 (AMS Press, Inc. photo. 
reprint 1978) (Macmillan & Co. 4th ed. 1932) (1920) (arguing that roads are overused because 
drivers are able to externalize the congestion costs they create). For a summary of the debate over 
how to optimally correct road congestion market failures, see generally Robin Lindsey, Do 
Economists Reach a Conclusion on Road Pricing? The Intellectual History of an Idea, 3 ECON J. 
WATCH 292 (2006). 
217 Philip Booth, Foreword to KEITH BOYFIELD ET AL., A MARKET IN AIRPORT SLOTS 12 
(Keith Boyfield ed., 2003). “Slot” is the industry term used to refer to a designated time when, and 
place where, an aircraft can take off or land from an airport. 
218 But see Damon C. Andrews, The Ownership–Usage Dichotomy and the Human Element in Newman’s 
Freeconomy, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 179, 186-87 (2013), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/ 
content/articles/2015/03/The-Ownership-Usage-Dichotomy-and-the-Human-Element-in-Newmans-
Freeconomy.pdf [http://perma.cc/T7KT-PSUC] (arguing that “overconsumption” is misleading in this 
context, since it fails to account for the gustatory pleasure derived by the overconsumers). 
219 See, e.g., Kathryn M. Sharpe, Underlying Contextual Effects Leading to Over Consumption: 
Extremeness Aversion and Bundling 2 (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University) 
(“Because the cost is spread over all tax payers and insurance premium holders, obesity imposes 
negative externalities on much of society.”). For an overview of the economic causes and 
repercussions of the obesity epidemic, see Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Economic Causes and Consequences 
of Obesity, 26 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 239 (2005). 
  
2015] Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations 187 
 
Systematic overconsumption does not always occur in the presence of 
zero-price products. If, for example, a strong social norm is in place to 
prevent such behavior, consumers may follow the norm. In one experiment, 
students who were offered a piece of candy in exchange for $0.01 purchased, 
on average, approximately four pieces of candy. When the same candy was 
made freely available in exchange for $0, the total number of “customers” 
increased, but almost none of the students took more than a single piece. 
Researchers theorized that a limiting social norm regarding “free” candy 
bowls trumped the zero-price effect observable in settings where at least one 
positively priced competing product was available.220 Absent a countervailing 
norm, however, systematic overconsumption can be a socially undesirable 
side effect of zero prices. 
c.  The Limits of Behavioral Antitrust 
Proposing that antitrust enforcers and judges take into account the 
findings of behavioral economics is not uncontroversial.221 Perhaps the 
primary criticism of behavioral antitrust is that the evidence it presents as 
reflecting the “real world” typically stems from laboratory and field experiments 
involving college students, or other individual actors.222 And the behavioral 
economics literature discussed above is certainly subject to this criticism.223 
As such, it may have little to say about how firms think and act. Admittedly, a 
firm is a collection of individual humans, but it is also a separate, nonhuman 
entity governed by a unique set of laws. And even granting that individual 
employees could impart their own biases and cognitive limitations into the 
firm’s decisions and actions, behavioral economics has not yet demonstrated 
that they do so in a systematic way that mirrors their individual choices. 
People may act differently in a group that is organized into a corporate form 
than they do in other groups or on their own. Unless contradicted by future 
research, this will remain a fatal flaw. There is no principled reason to assume 
that the teachings of behavioral economics map perfectly (or even at all) onto 
firm behavior. For analysts conducting antitrust law in practice, with implications 
 
220 Shampanier et al., supra note 209, at 743. 
221 See, e.g., Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, The Empty Promise of Behavioral Antitrust, 37 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1009, 1014 (2014) (“[W]e show that behavioral antitrust is malleable to the point of 
being meaningless. In this respect, we part company with those skeptics of behavioral antitrust who 
believe that the field can serve an ancillary role in contemporary antitrust jurisprudence.”).  
222 See Wright & Stone, supra note 197, at 1523-24 (“[W]hile firms may be, at their core, self-selected 
aggregations of individuals, it does not follow that firms necessarily behave with similar, or 
similarly predictable, consequences.”). 
223 See supra subsection III.B.2. 
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for real-world actors, reliance on behavioral economics for that purpose is 
(at least) premature. 
All of this suggests that the behavioral economics literature discussed 
above can be relied on when analyzing the behavior of individual human 
consumers, but not necessarily that of firms.224 There appear to be no 
existing studies that attempt to answer whether firms are subject to zero-price 
effects. An extremely rough survey of where zero-price offers tend to be 
prevalent, however, suggests that firms are less susceptible to, and perhaps 
largely immune from, such effects. In their seminal paper on two-sided 
markets, Rochet and Tirole list several examples of existing two-sided 
business models.225 Among these are several where zero-price products now 
feature prevalently: creative content, Internet browsers, broadcast television, 
and credit and debit cards.226 To these I would add online newspapers and various 
web-based software programs like email, word processing, and spreadsheet 
programs. These two-sided examples are illustrative because they require a 
platform to set a price level and structure to two different groups: one 
comprising individuals and one comprising firms. Content today, for example, 
is often delivered via a platform bringing together consumers and advertisers. 
Broadcast television, other than subsidized public programming, operates 
similarly. Credit card platforms bring together merchants, typically firms, 
and individual cardholders. 
Tellingly, in each of these examples where a firm operating the platform 
sets prices to both groups, zero prices obtain only on the individual human 
consumer side of the market. Firms generally face positive prices. Thus, for 
example, while both advertisers and consumers incur costs to access an 
online content delivery platform, the platform sets positive prices to 
advertisers and zero prices to consumers. Likewise, as to payment cards, the 
networks charge substantial interchange fees to merchants but offer cards to 
individuals at zero, or even negative, prices.227 If firms and individuals were 
equally subject to zero-price effects, one would expect to see a mix of price 
structures in two-sided markets featuring zero prices. The relative scarcity 
of zero-price offers to firm-facing sides of markets suggests that firms are 
less “predictably irrational” than human consumers. Again, this is far from a 
 
224 This is true regardless whether the firm being analyzed is acting as a consumer, buyer, or seller. 
225 Rochet & Tirole, supra note 33, at 992 tbl.1. 
226 Id. 
227 A cardholder who uses a payment card that is attached to a rewards program and that 
does not require payment of an annual fee is, in effect, paying less than zero to use the card. The 
success of credit card rewards programs borders on incredible—nearly every card today offers 
some sort of rewards for its use. Interestingly, this suggests that there may exist a “less-than-zero 
price effect.” 
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rigorous survey, and it is not meant to demonstrate that there are no (or 
merely few) instances where businesses consume zero-price products—such 
instances exist, though they appear to be relatively rare as compared to the 
instances of human consumption.228 Yet it certainly does not refute the 
criticism of behavioral economics noted above.229 Rather, it appears to 
confirm that critics urging the limited applicability of behavioral economics 
to firm behavior may have a valid point. 
3.  Conclusions 
The market features described above tend to reduce the efficacy of 
competition. Most relevantly for present purposes, they generally limit 
customers’ ability to act as a check on anticompetitive behavior. Some zero-price 
markets may demonstrate additional features beyond those discussed above 
that tend to reduce the efficacy of competition.230 As a general principle, 
competition in zero-price markets likely functions less efficiently than it 
does in the markets that were the subject of traditional antitrust analyses.231 
The efficacy of competition in the marketplace has ramifications for error-cost 
analyses of antitrust: if markets are less likely to self-correct, the costs of 
false negatives increase. On the other hand, antitrust is institutionally 
ill-equipped to address many of these structural and behavioral deviations. 
Perfect competition, in any market, is an unreachable ideal; it may just be 
particularly so in zero-price markets. 
C.  Harm to Competition and Consumers 
The structure and features of zero-price markets strongly suggest that 
market failures frequently occur, and that such markets do not necessarily 
yield optimal outcomes. Whether antitrust law ought to be used as a corrective 
 
228 For examples of businesses consuming zero-price services, see generally David S. Evans, 
Excessive Litigation by Business Users of Free Platform Services (Univ. of Chi. Coase–Sandor Inst. for 
Law & Econ., Paper No. 603, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2085029 
[http://perma.cc/6F9A-C4M5]. 
229 See, e.g., supra note 221. 
230 See, e.g., Argenton & Prüfer, supra note 91, at 76 (explaining that “indirect externalities 
arise in the market for search engines because users will not consider . . . that the results of their 
query are stored by the search engine”). Argenton and Prüfer conclude that these indirect network 
externalities make the search engine market a natural monopoly, and that the collapse to a 
monopolist-dominated market would harm welfare. Id. at 76-77. 
231 Cf. Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Microeconomics of Technical Progress (arguing that markets 
associated with knowledge and information are among those markets that “are, inherently, 
imperfect”), in TECHNOLOGY GENERATION IN LATIN AMERICAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
56, 59-61 (Jorge M. Katz ed., 1987). 
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tool depends first on whether conduct by participants in these markets can 
cause the type of harm antitrust law is meant to remedy. Modern consensus 
holds that antitrust is meant to remedy disruptions of the competitive process 
that harm consumer welfare.232  
Conceptually, antitrust harm in zero-price markets is similar to harm in 
positive-price markets. Only the medium, not the structure or fact, of 
exchange is different. The same types of conduct traditionally condemned 
by antitrust law also warrant scrutiny in the zero-price context. For example, 
a merger-to-monopoly between two head-to-head rivals can allow monopolistic 
overcharges, whether those overcharges occur via the traditional medium of 
money or via attention or information.233 A monopolist in a zero-price 
market may impose a naked restraint on innovation by rivals.234 A cartel 
may engage in product–market division or fix levels of advertising. 
The most fundamental problem regarding harm in zero-price markets 
arises from refusing or failing to acknowledge the existence, or even the 
possibility, of such harm. Failure to understand that consumers can and do 
exchange attention and/or information for valuable products can lead to 
costly errors in judgment. Antitrust analysts currently are hampered by an 
inability to conceive of zero-price markets as relevant antitrust markets, 
likely due to having been thoroughly steeped in neoclassical, price-focused 
theory. This inability can cause—and likely has caused—analysts to 
conclude incorrectly that consumers cannot be harmed by a transaction or 
event because there is no market in which consumer harm could occur.235 
The following discusses one example of such an oversight.236 
In the 1990s, Congress experimented with deregulating many industries, 
among them broadcast radio. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 relaxed 
limitations on radio station ownership.237 Massive industry consolidation 
followed. Less than a decade after Congress began deregulating the radio 
 
232 See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps 
Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2406 (referring to “[t]he promotion of economic welfare as 
the lodestar of antitrust laws” (footnote omitted)). 
233 See infra notes 244–50 and accompanying text (discussing the example of radio mergers). 
234 Microsoft’s conduct targeting the zero-price Netscape browser (and, ultimately, the 
spread of Java as a multiplatform-capable programming language) comes close to exemplifying this 
type of harm. CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 248-50 (2012). 
235 This type of error is commonly known as a Type II error. 
236 Unfortunately, this was likely not an isolated occurrence. See, e.g., Grunes & Stucke, supra 
note 86, at 7 (“Antitrust enforcers historically ignored the viewer’s or listener’s role in traditional 
radio and television media.”); infra note 257 (discussing a similar oversight in the context of newspapers). 
237 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
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industry in earnest, the degree of market concentration was already striking. 
Prior to deregulation, no single company owned more than forty radio 
stations.238 By 2002, a single firm owned over 1200 stations and allegedly 
dominated the audience share in 100 major markets.239 In Minot, the fourth-largest 
city in North Dakota, a single firm allegedly owned every commercial broadcast 
radio station competing in the market.240 
Many of the mergers and acquisitions that led to these high concentration 
levels were reviewable by the U.S. government’s antitrust enforcement 
agencies.241 Yet the DOJ Antitrust Division, which was responsible for 
reviewing the mergers under the Clayton Act, failed entirely to consider the 
implications for consumers.242 Instead, the agency’s attorneys and economists 
focused solely on whether the transactions would cause harm to the advertiser 
side of the market.243 In a speech to a group of radio industry stakeholders, 
then–Acting Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein carefully outlined DOJ’s 
analytical process regarding radio mergers.244 DOJ’s analyses of both market 
definition and market power dealt solely with prices to advertisers.245 Harm to 
consumers was not considered. 
For an agency that prides itself on promoting consumer welfare,246 this 
oversight may seem inexplicable. In fact, it is very likely due to the influence of 
 
238 Houghton, supra note 14. 
239 That firm was Clear Channel Communications. Jeff Perlstein, Clear Channel: The Media Mammoth 
That Stole the Airwaves, RECLAIM DEMOCRACY (Nov. 2002), http://reclaimdemocracy.org/clear_ 
channel_backlash [http://perma.cc/L83R-JCN7]. 
240 Jennifer S. Lee, On Minot, N.D., Radio, A Single Corporate Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 
2003, at C7. A competing account states that there was one additional commercial station 
operating in the market. See Jack Shafer, What Really Happened in Minot, N.D.?, SLATE (Jan. 10, 
2007, 6:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/press_box/2007/01/what_really_ 
happened_in_minot_nd.html [http://perma.cc/FT44-ZAUR]. 
241 See, e.g., ROGER L. SADLER, ELECTRONIC MEDIA LAW 118-19 (2005) (describing the 
wave of media mergers in the 1990s). 
242 See Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Why More Antitrust Immunity for the Media Is a 
Bad Idea, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2011) (“In analyzing radio mergers under the Clayton 
Act, DOJ considered their economic impact solely with respect to advertisers and the rates they 
paid even though many possible product markets exist . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
243 Id. 
244 Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at 
the ANA Hotel: DOJ Analysis of Radio Mergers (Feb. 19, 1997), http://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
public/speeches/1055.pdf [http://perma.cc/T8XD-EN3T]. 
245 Id. at 7-19. 
246 E.g., THOMAS O. BARNETT & HILL B. WELLFORD, ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, THE DOJ’S SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT REPORT: PROMOTING CONSUMER WELFARE 
THROUGH CLEARER STANDARDS FOR SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT, http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/dojs-single-firm-conduct-report-promoting-consumer-welfare-through-clearer-standards-section-2 
[http://perma.cc/6Z5S-DJX8] (last updated 2015). 
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price-focused economics.247 As to each proposed transaction, DOJ analysts 
considered whether the merged entity would likely impose profitable price 
increases on advertisers.248 To be sure, higher prices to advertisers is one 
source of potential harm in a zero-price market. What DOJ failed to 
understand is that higher advertiser prices were not the only source of 
potential harm. 
To illustrate, assume Station A and Station B are the only radio stations 
competing in a given geographic market. Both stations compete for listeners 
by offering zero-price broadcast radio programming in exchange for 
listeners’ attention to advertisements.249 Both stations also compete for 
advertisers by offering access to listeners’ attention in exchange for money.250 If 
A and B were to merge, the newly formed entity could potentially exercise 
market power either by (1) increasing prices (and restricting output) to 
advertisers, or (2) increasing attention costs (and restricting output) to 
listeners by, for example, increasing the amount of airtime devoted to 
advertisements.251 Either strategy, if successful, would cause the type of 
welfare harms that antitrust law is meant to prevent. In economics parlance, 
Type II (false negative) errors may arise where an analyst fails to investigate 
the latter source of harm.252 
The wave of deregulation following passage of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 essentially comprised hundreds of As merging with hundreds of 
Bs. This consolidation created an experiment that raises and allows an 
answer to the following question: what happens to attention costs in zero-price 
broadcast radio markets when competition is reduced? Empirical analysis 
demonstrates exactly what one would expect if attention-cost rivalry were 
 
247 See infra Section IV.B. 
248 Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 1.11 (rev. 1997) [hereinafter HMGS] (“[T]he Agency will delineate the product 
market to be a product or group of products such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that 
was the only present and future seller of those products (‘monopolist’) likely would impose at least 
a ‘small but significant and nontransitory’ increase in price.”). 
249 Cf. Clear Channel Communications, WIKINVEST, http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Clear_ 
Channel_Communications#Radio_Broadcasting_2 [http://perma.cc/4WJZ-W5CB] (last visited Sept. 
19, 2015) (“Besides ad revenues themselves, Clear Channel’s radio broadcasting division also 
competes for greater audiences, which are the source of the value of their ad spots.”). 
250 Cf. id. (“The radio industry . . . compete[s] with many forms of media for advertising dollars.”). 
251 See Ivan Reidel, The Taylor Swift Paradox: Superstardom, Excessive Advertising and Blanket 
Licenses, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 731, 748 (2011) (“A station with market power over audiences will be 
able to increase advertising time, and one with power over advertisers will likely be able to 
increase advertising prices by reducing available air-time for ads.”). 
252 See, e.g., Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 79 
(2010) (“Courts, agencies, and academics have reacted to antitrust’s unusual vulnerability to error 
by adopting a bias in favor of false negatives (Type II errors).”). 
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taken seriously: as market concentration increased, the amount of time 
devoted to advertisements also increased.253 In short, the wave of mergers 
eliminated a great deal of competition in the broadcast radio markets for 
listeners—the markets DOJ ignored. After competition was eliminated, the 
remaining firms exercised their newfound market power by increasing 
attention costs. Tellingly, the amount of time devoted to advertisements 
increased most sharply during times of the day when listeners have fewer 
close substitutes.254 In short, millions of consumers have been harmed 
through paying monopolistic overcharges, due in large part to antitrust law’s 
failure to account for zero-price markets. 
DOJ’s single-minded focus on positive-price markets—here, the 
advertiser side of broadcast radio markets—led it to overlook precisely the 
type of harm that is at the core of its mission. Conduct that enhanced 
market power was not stopped in its incipiency—and in the merger context, 
incipiency is often the only viable stage for intervention. This massive 
oversight has gone unchallenged on such orthodox grounds. A few scholars 
have criticized DOJ’s approach to broadcast radio mergers for failure to 
properly account for potential harm to the democratic process.255 That type 
of harm, however, lies outside the generally agreed-upon purview of modern 
U.S. antitrust enforcement.256 But even taking as a given the consensus view 
of antitrust’s goals, ignoring the potential harms that can occur in zero-price 
markets is incorrect as a matter of antitrust policy. In economics parlance, it 
risks Type II (false negative) error. 
Broadcast radio markets provide just one example of potential regulatory 
oversight failures. “Free” weekly newspaper markets may be another example,257 
 
253 Mooney, supra note 161, at 19. 
254 Id. 
255 See, e.g., Stucke & Grunes, supra note 242, at 1411-12 (“The DOJ’s radio merger consent 
decrees never address nonprice competition . . . . Nothing in the Clayton Act restricts the DOJ to 
consider solely advertising competition.”). 
256 See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 12, at 14-15 (noting a general consensus view that antitrust’s 
sole aim is protecting consumer welfare, as the term is generally used by neoclassical economists). 
257 Both Canadian and U.S. competition authorities also appear to have overlooked potential 
consumer harms in zero-price newspaper markets. In 2014, Canada’s Competition Bureau concluded its 
evaluation of the proposed acquisition by Transcontinental of Quebecor Media. Press Release, 
Competition Bureau, Statement Regarding the Acquisition by Transcontinental of Quebecor Media’s 
Community Newspapers in Quebec (May 28, 2014), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/eng/03740.html [http://perma.cc/U3XY-BFWR]. Both firms operated community newspapers, 
which according to the Bureau are “free weeklies that are distributed door-to-door.” Id. The 
weeklies were not really “free” to consumers, however, who paid for the papers with attention to 
advertisements. Yet the Bureau defined the relevant market as “advertising in community 
newspapers,” and focused heavily on potential harm to advertisers in the form of higher prices. Id. 
The Bureau briefly noted the potential “impact . . . on the quality of the content offered to 
readers,” id., but failed to analyze the potential for harm to readers via higher attention costs. This 
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though one that appears to lack empirical data confirming consumer harm. 
The FTC’s competition analysis of Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram may 
have been a recent example of Type II error in a high-technology market. To an 
FTC regulator focused on harm to positive-price markets, Facebook–Instagram 
would clearly have posed no threat: Instagram had not yet been monetized.258 
And, even if it had been, Internet advertisers may well have exhibited 
demand that was much more elastic with regard to a particular type of 
platform (e.g., photo-sharing social networks) than was users’ demand for 
that platform.259 Though antitrust theorists remained largely silent on the 
deal, commentators from the business community identified it as a strategic 
acquisition designed to eliminate competition in the (zero-price) market for 
users.260 Despite this, Facebook’s acquisition was unanimously approved 
without comment.261 
Ex ante, civilians cannot conclude with certainty whether a Type II error 
will occur if enforcers or courts decline to find antitrust liability for a 
certain instance of conduct. Determining whether other products are close 
enough substitutes to prevent a firm from exercising market power over 
listeners, readers, or users requires detailed analyses of facts beyond the reach 
of ordinary individuals.262 And even enforcement agencies and courts admit 
 
analysis was similar to DOJ’s conclusions regarding a geographic-market-allocation conspiracy 
between Village Voice and New Times, the two largest U.S. chains of zero-price “alternative 
newsweeklies.” See generally United States v. Vill. Voice Media, LLC, No. 1:03 CV 0164, 2003 WL 
21659092, at *13-20 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2003). DOJ’s analysis of competition between the two 
firms focused on price competition for advertisers’ business and “editorial competition” (e.g., new 
features or increased investigative journalism) for readers. Id. DOJ’s competitive impact statement 
did not, however, address the possibility that the market-allocation scheme could have resulted in 
increased attention costs to readers.  
258 Shayndi Raice & Spencer E. Ante, Insta-Rich: $1 Billion for Instagram, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
10, 2012, at B1. 
259 For example, an advertiser may not be quite as sensitive to whether an ad appears on a 
news website or a social network—the two can be fairly close substitutes. Yet for users, the two 
products may be quite distant substitutes, as they serve very different purposes. 
260 See, e.g., Raice & Ante, supra note 258, at B6 (“All this growth hasn’t yet translated to 
revenue. But in the lingua franca of today’s social-media industry that doesn’t matter as much as 
user engagement and the ability to access those users’ personal data.”). 
261 See Press Release, FTC, FTC Closes Its Investigation into Facebook’s Proposed Acquisition of 
Instagram Photo Sharing Program (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/ 
ftc-closes-its-investigation-facebooks-proposed-acquisition [https://perma.cc/VE9T-2X63] (“[T]he 
[Facebook–Instagram] deal may now proceed as proposed. The Commission vote to close the 
investigation was 5-0.”). 
262 Among other unique tools, the Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 
authorizes DOJ and the FTC to use civil investigative demands to compel production of 
documents and data before filing complaints. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012). Canada’s Competition Bureau 
has similar authority to conduct precomplaint discovery. For details on this process, see Complaint 
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that absolute certainty is impossible.263 The point is that antitrust institutions 
have—at the very least—a duty to conduct such analyses in zero-price markets.264 
Where market analyses are not conducted, there is potential for massive harm 
to consumer welfare due to systematic underenforcement of antitrust laws. 
D.  Explaining the Failure of Antitrust Law and Economics 
Modern antitrust theory and practice—the “antitrust enterprise”265—
traces its roots to a time when national output was heavily dependent on 
raw natural resources and manufactured goods. Economies were agrarian 
and industrial. And, unsurprisingly, the traditional targets of antitrust 
enforcement competed in commoditized lines of commerce: oil, steel, 
aluminum, tobacco, and the like.266 For purposes of economic and antitrust 
analyses, this type of market is relatively simple to navigate. The relevant 
products are largely homogeneous—one bushel of corn, foot of pipe, or 
pound of cement is generally a nearly perfect substitute for another. 
Production is often subject to substantial economies of scale,267 a feature 
that tends to increase market concentration and yield a manageable number 
of large, established competitors in a given market.268 Barriers to entry 
often consist primarily of time and capital.269 And firms compete primarily 
by setting price270 or output271 levels, rather than by product innovation. 
Given this relative simplicity, antitrust courts and scholars attempting to 
 
Process, COMPETITION BUREAU, http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_00019.html 
[http://perma.cc/RVP6-2HAC] (last updated Jan. 11, 2012). 
263 See, e.g., J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981) (“The 
vagaries of the marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge of what plaintiff ’s situation would have 
been in the absence of the defendant’s antitrust violation.”). 
264 See, e.g., Antitrust Division: Mission, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/ 
mission.html [http://perma.cc/XS2R-7UXA] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015) (“The mission of the Antitrust 
Division is to promote economic competition through enforcing . . . antitrust laws and principles.”) 
265 HOVENKAMP, supra note 12. 
266 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.  
267 That is, the amount it costs a firm to produce an additional unit of output decreases as 
the firm’s scale increases. This function is due to the firm’s ability to spread its fixed costs (costs 
that do not vary with the rate of production) over a larger amount of output. 
268 See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 150-52 
(3d ed. 2000) (“Perhaps the most important explanation of why some industries are more 
concentrated than others is the magnitude of economies of scale relative to total market demand.”). 
269 Under the “Bainian” definition (named for its proponent and a pioneer in the study of 
entry barriers, Joe Bain), scale economies themselves are properly considered to be entry barriers. 
See generally JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 1968) (1959). 
270 As is the case under the Bertrand model of competition. 
271 As is the case under the Cournot model. 
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understand strategic behavior in such markets could engage in fairly 
straightforward applications of foundational economic principles.272 
During the mid–twentieth century, neoclassicists associated with the 
Chicago School of Economics developed a set of tools to be used for 
analyzing industrial organization. The tools themselves were fairly simple—
for example, the idea that the relationship between price and quantity in a 
given market can be described by a downward-sloping demand curve.273 
Due to the central role played by prices in formulating and applying each of 
these tools, the resulting approach became known as “price theory.”274 And, 
though economists, attorneys, and courts frequently used “price” as a stand-in 
for other avenues of competition (e.g., quality)—this dependence on prices 
as such inevitably led to a rather singular focus on price competition. So 
long as the bulk of the economy comprised markets with positive prices, the 
resulting risk of Type II error was relatively small.275 
The world has changed. A series of disruptive innovations centered on 
digital computing and networking has upended many traditional market 
structures. While firms still compete in commoditized markets, and 
developing economies often comprise predominantly agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors, developed economies have grown to rely instead on 
technology sectors, which tend to be considerably more complex for 
purposes of antitrust law and economics.276 The universe of homogeneous 
goods and static price competition that gave birth to modern analyses now 
bears little resemblance to much of the actual, present-day world in which 
firms and consumers interact. 
One particularly striking—and under-researched—consequence of the 
digital revolution is the rise to prominence of firms offering goods and 
services at zero prices. While zero-price products have existed for many 
decades, even centuries, such offerings have increased exponentially and 
 
272 Such principles include, for example, downward-sloping demand curves and upward-
sloping, long-run, actual-cost curves. Cf., e.g., Alan Devlin, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on the Law of 
Product Tying, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 521, 560-61 (2007) (“[T]raditional antitrust jurisprudence has 
been aimed at those industries with eventual rising average costs in production.”). 
273 E.g., Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928 (1979). 
274 See id. 
275 Though such a risk was certainly present, as the foregoing discussion of consumer harm 
in broadcast radio markets clearly suggests. 
276 Among these differences are “falling average costs . . . over a broad range of output, . . . very 
high rates of innovation, . . . and economies of scale in consumption (also known as ‘network 
externalities’).” Posner, New Economy, supra note 177, at 926. Posner also argued that technology 
markets are characterized by “modest capital requirements relative to what is available for new 
enterprises from the modern capital market.” Id. 
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now feature conspicuously across modern markets.277 Creative content (e.g., 
films, music, books, and articles), software, search functionality, social media 
platforms, mobile applications, travel booking, and myriad other goods and 
services are now widely distributed at zero prices.278 
Antitrust law, however, has failed to evolve to account for the disappearance 
of prices. The antitrust enterprise remains firmly grounded in price theory, 
yet this dependence has inevitably led to an exclusive focus on price 
competition that is often inappropriate in the face of zero prices. As a 
fundamental matter, the single-minded focus on prices can cause antitrust 
institutions to overlook entirely the presence of zero-price markets.279 
Furthermore, many of the analytical tools developed by antitrust theorists 
over recent decades have proved inadequate, even entirely unworkable, when 
applied to zero-price markets. Consider market definition, widely considered 
to be the foundational inquiry in civil antitrust investigations and litigation. 
The touchstone for most modern market definition analyses is whether a 
hypothetical monopolist or cartel could profitably impose a small increase in 
price.280 Corollary to defining the relevant market (and of even more 
importance) is the question of whether a firm has market power. Yet here 
again the most widely cited legal standard—whether the firm has the ability 
to “control prices or exclude competition”281—is (at least in part) facially 
inapplicable to a market featuring zero prices. 
Price theory has done much to rationalize the antitrust enterprise. Yet 
the singular focus on market prices has caused a severe dissonance between 
antitrust law and modern marketplace reality. Many of the basic insights of 
price theorists, though developed with positive-price markets in mind, can 
apply to zero-price markets. That said, if it is to remain accurate that 
“antitrust doctrine is supple enough . . . to take in stride the competitive 
issues presented by the new economy,”282 antitrust law must confront 
squarely the issue of competition in zero-price markets. 
 
277 See Evans, Antitrust Economics, supra note 1, at 72 (“Despite the observation that free has a 
long pedigree, zero-price offers seem to have exploded with the growth of the web-based economy.”); 
see also Newman, Copyright Freeconomics, supra note 21, at 1437 (“Today, the array of legitimate, 
‘professional’ content that is accessible at zero or negligible prices is truly incredible.” (footnote omitted)). 
278 See generally Newman, Copyright Freeconomics, supra note 21. 
279 See supra note 235 and accompanying text (discussing Type II error in this context). 
280 HMGS, supra note 248, § 1.11. 
281 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
282 Posner, New Economy, supra note 177, at 925. 
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IV.  ANTITRUST LAW IN ZERO-PRICE MARKETS 
Given that zero-price markets fall within the ambit of the antitrust laws, 
the question becomes one of (first) institutional appropriateness and 
(second) institutional approach. The modern antitrust enterprise correctly 
proceeds with an awareness of its own limitations.283  
A.  The Role and Efficacy of Antitrust 
Applying antitrust laws to zero-price markets is no straightforward task. 
The narrow-minded focus on price competition exhibited throughout much 
of antitrust law’s developmental history has yielded analytical frameworks 
suited only for use in positive-price product markets.284 Zero-price markets 
fall within the statutory scope of the antitrust laws.285 But what is the role 
antitrust should play in zero-price marketplaces? And how well can it hope 
to do so? 
In zero-price product markets—as in all markets—the overarching goal 
of antitrust law is to ensure that firms are incentivized to increase quality, 
lower costs, or innovate so that consumers ultimately reap welfare benefits.286 
Here, though, the primary costs of products to consumers consist of attention 
and information costs. Antitrust law in zero-price markets should seek 
primarily to ensure that buyers receive the best possible products while 
minimizing the attention and information costs buyers must exchange for 
those products. Again, antitrust accomplishes these goals by protecting the 
competitive process. 
Beliefs about the ability of markets to discipline anticompetitive 
behavior inform the design of antitrust rules and methodologies. Thus, 
market features affecting that ability carry important implications regarding 
the role and efficacy of the antitrust enterprise. As noted above, at least 
some features of zero-price markets reduce the efficacy of competition.287 
 
283 See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of 
Antitrust Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2 (2012) (“The practical value of proposals . . . must be 
evaluated with an eye to the institutional limitations that antitrust agencies and courts face when 
engaged in predictive fact-finding.”). 
284 Many would argue that some antitrust methodologies are poorly suited even for positive-price 
markets. For an example of this argument, see Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 437 (2010). 
285 See supra Section III.D. 
286 See 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 100a (4th ed. 2013) 
(“[T]he principal objective of antitrust policy is to maximize consumer welfare by encouraging 
firms to behave competitively . . . .”). 
287 See supra Section III.B. 
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Consequently, much of the criticism directed at antitrust enforcement in 
high-technology markets, including many zero-price markets, loses some of 
its force. This criticism is frequently premised in part on the influential 
error-cost framework popularized by Judge Frank Easterbrook.288 Error-cost 
analysis, as employed by conservative courts and scholars, assumes that “the 
economic system corrects monopoly more readily than it corrects judicial 
errors.”289 This assumption leads to the conclusion that false positives (i.e., 
courts wrongly condemning benign behavior) impose greater societal costs 
than false negatives (i.e., courts failing to condemn anticompetitive 
behavior).290 This is because markets have no mechanism for correcting a 
judicial ruling that wrongly condemns benign behavior and thereby chills 
potentially beneficial behavior by other firms. Markets supposedly are, 
however, ready and able to correct judicially unchecked anticompetitive behavior. 
The strength and validity of that core assumption, as well as its practical 
ramifications for designing antitrust enforcement mechanisms, depend on 
the efficacy of competition—that is, how efficiently competitive processes 
are able to achieve pro-consumer outcomes. Competition in zero-price 
markets is likely not as efficacious as competition in the archetypical markets at 
the heart of early antitrust law and theory.291 Where calls for antitrust 
enforcers to be exceedingly cautious when—or even refrain entirely 
from292—attempting to improve consumer welfare in zero-price markets 
depend on the assumption that competition will quickly and efficiently 
cure anticompetitive conduct, these calls should be viewed with skepticism. 
 
288 See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 
J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153, 156 (2010) (“The first weapon is the error-cost framework, 
which owes its intellectual foundation to Easterbrook’s article, and, we claim, contrary to some 
recent critics and agency authorities, is crucial to identifying optimal antitrust rules in the New 
Economy.”). As Jonathan Baker points out, the framework “was first employed in the law and 
economics literature during the 1970s and introduced into mainstream antitrust scholarship by 
Paul Joskow and Alvin Klevorick in 1979.” Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error out of “Error Cost” 
Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 4 (2015) (footnote omitted). 
289 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984). 
290 In the context of dominant-firm conduct, the Antitrust Division has come quite close to 
espousing this view. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM 
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 17 (2008) (“Some believe as a general 
rule that, in the section 2 context, the cost of false positives is higher than the cost of false negatives.”).  
291 See supra Sections III.A-B. 
292 See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber, Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation, 4 J. COMPETITION 
L. & ECON. 915, 965-66 (2008). Spulber concludes that “[m]arkets can be expected to guide the 
adoption of technology efficiently,” that “there are no market failures in technology adoption,” and 
that “[g]overnment agencies cannot expect to replicate or improve upon private sector knowledge.” Id. 
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Yet it is equally true that antitrust enforcers should not “rush in where 
Angels fear to tread.”293 Some of the market features that frustrate customer 
attempts to compare costs in zero-price markets are equally frustrating to 
antitrust analysts.294 The proper approach is one that is cautiously and 
idiosyncratically tailored to the relevant market(s); is grounded in actual 
empirical evidence; and relies only upon those theories that, as tested 
against available data, offer the greatest predictive power.295 With regards to 
error costs, this approach would not entirely discount the risks of false 
positives—as former Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney seemed 
to do in stating that “[t]here is no such thing as a false positive.”296 Nor, 
however, would it ignore the risks of underenforcement, particularly given 
that competitive forces may be less effective remedies for anticompetitive 
behavior in zero-price markets than elsewhere. It would also discount the 
incorrect assumptions that previously drove lopsidedly conservative 
applications of the error-cost framework297—which ought to be ideologically 
neutral. Finally, it would take into account the unique effects zero prices can 
have on human consumer behavior.298 
 
293 POPE’S AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM 25 (John Sargeaunt ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1909) (1711) (emphasis omitted). 
294 See supra notes 186–90 and accompanying text. 
295 This draws from Joshua Wright’s “evidence-based antitrust” approach, which entails in 
part reliance upon “a principle embraced by virtually all antitrust observers: a commitment to 
testing economic theories with economic knowledge and empirical data to support those theories 
with the best predictive power.” Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The 
Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 241, 242-43 (2012). As explained above, 
however, it would likely depart at least somewhat from Wright’s version of error-cost analysis. 
296 Sean Gates, Obama’s Antitrust Enforcers: What Can We Expect?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, 
Apr. 2009, at 1, 2, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Apr09 
_Gates4_28f.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/G8NX-4ZE6]. Varney went on to observe that, 
“at least in [her] own experience, there is not a dominant incumbent who hasn’t done something 
that was lawful because they were afraid that it might be reviewed by DOJ or a state attorney 
general or the FTC.” Id. Interpreted conservatively, Varney was not literally claiming that false 
positives do not exist. Rather, the argument was that antitrust enforcers ought not factor the risk 
of false positives into their decisionmaking. See id. (“I think the more people in the bar start 
rejecting this idea of false positives the better off we’re going to be.”).  
297 See Baker, supra note 288, at 4-7. Baker specifically points first to erroneous assumptions 
about markets: that markets are always (quickly) self-correcting via entry, that oligopolies compete 
vigorously, that monopolies create incentives for innovation, that monopolists can obtain only a 
single monopoly profit, and that practices common in competitive markets can never be 
anticompetitive. Id. at 7-23. Baker also highlights incorrect assumptions regarding institutions: 
that false positives are more durable than false negatives, that competitors frequently manipulate 
antitrust agencies into making anticompetitive enforcement decisions, that courts are incapable of 
identifying harmful exclusionary conduct, and that private antitrust enforcement can run 
unchecked by courts. Id. at 23-36.  
298 See supra subsection III.B.2. 
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B.  The Zero-Price Effect and Consumer Welfare 
Zero prices do not necessarily tend to yield massive (or any) consumer 
welfare surplus. Contrary claims have, however, been made. Evans points to 
“the vast amount of consumer surplus that likely results from products and 
services offered for free.”299 Gal and Rubinfeld posit that “[m]ore often than 
not, free goods and services provide real benefits to consumers and are 
clearly pro-competitive.”300 Industry analyst Bill Gurley states, “One might 
yearn to suggest that there is a market [failure] here that should be 
investigated by some government entity, but let us not forget that the 
consumer is not harmed here—in fact far from it.”301 Google’s senior 
competition counsel, Dana Wagner, urges the public to “[k]eep in mind that 
competition laws are concerned with what’s best for consumers, not for 
competing companies, and there’s little doubt that from a consumer 
perspective, free products are usually a great thing.”302 
Flowing naturally from this view is the conclusion that courts and 
enforcement agencies ought to be extremely cautious when applying 
antitrust law to suppliers of zero-price products. Given modern antitrust 
law’s generally agreed-upon goal of maximizing consumer welfare,303 
practices that tend to create net consumer surplus are today almost entirely 
insulated from antitrust scrutiny.304 Claims alleging anticompetitive product 
design provide one example of this cautious approach. True product 
innovation often yields enormous benefits to consumer welfare, total 
welfare, or both.305 Recognizing this, many courts have grown quite wary of 
 
299 Evans, Antitrust Economics, supra note 1, at 73. 
300 Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 48, at 3. 
301 Bill Gurley, The Freight Train That Is Android, ABOVE THE CROWD (Mar. 24, 2011), 
http://abovethecrowd.com/2011/03/24/freight-train-that-is-android/ [http://perma.cc/MZ7A-ADZ5]. 
302 Dana Wagner, Is Free an Antitrust Issue?, GOOGLE PUB. POL’Y BLOG (July 10, 2009), 
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/07/is-free-antitrust-issue.html [http://perma.cc/6P6T-S7BH]. 
303 See supra note 286 and accompanying text. 
304 Cf., e.g., Fiona Scott-Morton, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Antitrust Div., Antitrust Enforcement in High-Technology Industries: Protecting Innovation and 
Competition, Remarks Before the 2012 New York State Bar Association Annual Antitrust Forum 
8-9 (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518956/download [http://perma.cc/K3H3-R3LG] 
(“[G]iven the greater degree of uncertainty present when assessing dynamics harms, the [DOJ 
Antitrust] Division emphasizes the importance of a fact-intensive inquiry into the transaction and 
the relevant markets . . . .”). 
305 Many contend that such benefits vastly outweigh those produced by static price 
competition, which was the primary focus of early antitrust case law and scholarship. See Damon 
C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in the Cloud, 73 MD. L. 
REV. 313, 350 (2013) (citing Ashutosh Bhagwat, Unnatural Competition?: Applying the New Antitrust 
Learning to Foster Competition in the Local Exchange, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1479, 1480 (1999)); J. 
Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & 
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false positives with regards to product design claims and have placed a high 
burden on plaintiffs who argue that product designs violate antitrust laws.306 If 
it were true that zero-price products necessarily create massive consumer welfare 
benefits, it would follow that antitrust institutions should proceed with caution (if 
at all) in analyzing claims alleging harm in zero-price markets. 
The zero-price welfare argument seems, reflexively, to make sense. In 
syllogistic form, it might run as follows: (1) zero-price products convey 
benefits to consumers, and (2) consumers reap those benefits without 
incurring any costs, therefore (3) zero-price markets create consumer 
welfare gains. A proponent might even point out that such gains would be 
infinite in relation to the costs to consumers. 
The logical flaw in this argument lies in its minor premise. Consumers 
of zero-price products pay for those products, at least when the zero-price 
products are offered as part of a sustainable business model.307 In the 
absence of a tying arrangement involving some positive-price product, 
consumers generally pay with their attention, information, or both.308 In 
tying arrangements, consumers may also pay with money. As to either 
category, there is no principled reason to believe that zero-price transactions—
the result of bilateral agreements whereby both parties surrender something 
of value as part of the exchange—necessarily create any more consumer 
welfare than transactions involving positive prices.309 
At least as to individual consumers, there remains the question of the 
consequences of the zero-price effect.310 On the one hand, individuals appear to 
behave as if zero prices, as compared to positive prices, represent not only 
decreased costs, but also increased benefits. Perhaps this seemingly irrational 
 
ECON. 581, 603 (2009) (“Industry after industry can demonstrate gains from dynamic 
(innovation-driven) competition that overshadow the gains when competition is present but 
innovation is absent.”). 
306 See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 285-87 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(requiring only evidence of some innovation or improvement—even in the face of proven 
disadvantages—for a product design to be held lawful); see also Newman, Anticompetitive Product 
Design, supra note 29, at 714-15 (“For over three decades, district and appellate courts have wrestled 
with how to approach claims that firms have engaged in anticompetitive, design-related behavior. 
A wide-ranging variety of analyses have been used, though due to the fear of stifling 
innovation .  .  . , courts have on the whole tended to be quite deferential to defendants.”). 
307 See supra Section I.A. 
308 Even in instances of promotional zero-pricing, consumers are generally paying with their 
attention. See supra subsection II.C.2.b.ii. 
309 Gal and Rubinfeld recognize that “[a]n analysis which focuses on the free good alone 
would often lead to the simplistic conclusion that the free good creates positive welfare effects, 
since the consumer receives the product at a price which does not even cover production and 
distribution costs.” Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 48, at 38. 
310 See supra Section III.C.  
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behavior allows them to accrue systematically some form of consumer 
surplus that a rational (nonhuman) firm would not receive.311 Additionally, 
as Gal and Rubinfeld point out, “[T]he free provision of goods . . . enables 
firms to increase demand for their product, thereby reaching a larger number 
of consumers.”312 This acceleration of the product-diffusion process offers 
some benefits.313  
On the other hand, however, zero prices often induce systematically 
inefficient consumption choices.314 To the extent that such systematic 
inefficiencies occur, they would—for purposes of deciding whether zero 
prices ought to act as an initial “thumb on the scale” in favor of antitrust 
defendants—counterbalance any uniquely human consumer welfare gains. 
The degree to which such inefficiencies do so depends on the degree to 
which irrational overconsumption takes place in the particular markets 
under consideration. Confidently answering that question is a complex and, 
in some (perhaps most) cases, presently unworkable problem. Empirical 
literature is scant and, as to many industries, nonexistent. Yet those same 
criticisms could be made of precisely measuring any potential consumer 
welfare gains. For present purposes, it suffices to say that behavioral 
economics should counsel neither strongly for nor against a welfare-based 
presumption in favor of defendants offering zero-price products. Without a 
persuasive argument to support it, such a presumption is unwarranted.315 
C.  Antitrust and Privacy 
At this point, some have raised the objection that privacy law already 
occupies the field.316 Applying antitrust law to zero-price markets based on 
 
311 See Andrews, supra note 218, at 185 (claiming that in the “new copyright 
freeconomy . . . wealth exists in the form of social status”). 
312 Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 48, at 14. 
313 See id. (“This, in turn, enables [firms] to learn more quickly about limitations or 
potentials of the product and fix [problems] more quickly, and potentially achieve scale economies, 
or strengthen the product’s network effects . . . .”). 
314 See supra Section III.C. 
315 Gal & Rubinfeld reach the opposite conclusion by pointing to, among other things, the 
increase in quality yielded by individuals contributing to free and open-source software without a 
profit motive. Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 48, at 14. The present focus, however, is on traditional, 
profit-motivated marketplace behavior. Gal and Rubinfeld also point to the possibility that new 
entrants can use “free goods” to “overcome high entry barriers into markets.” Id. at 13-14. To the 
extent new entrants do so, however, it may be more that they are exploiting irrational consumers 
(an inefficiency) than that they are somehow better situated than incumbents to offer zero prices—
indeed, the inverse seems more likely true. 
316 See, e.g., Darren S. Tucker & Hill B. Wellford, Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data, ANTITRUST 
SOURCE, Dec. 2014, at 1, 10 (“The antitrust laws were not intended to offer a solution to regulatory- 
and privacy-based agendas.”).  
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the presence of information costs, the argument runs, would be an 
inappropriate usurpation of territory traditionally occupied by privacy law; 
thus, antitrust scrutiny predicated on these grounds would be at best duplicative 
and at worse harmful. Privacy law as it relates to information-gathering 
practices has certainly captured the attention of popular presses, legislatures, 
and scholars.317 Seemingly intrusive marketing practices,318 sweeping 
government surveillance programs,319 and easily breached data storage 
centers320 all contribute to a sense of eroding privacy. Society at large perceives 
these developments as “creepy.”321 As a 2014 Pew Research survey report 
concludes, “There is little confidence in the security of common 
communications channels, and those who have heard about government 
surveillance programs are the least confident.”322  
This objection is based on a misguided understanding of both the 
privacy–antitrust relationship and marketplace behavior.323 Privacy law is 
concerned with the right of individuals to “control the ways in which 
personal information is obtained, processed, distributed, shared, and used 
by any other entity.”324 More specifically, information-related privacy violations 
 
317 For a brief overview of the status of the debate at the turn of the millennium, see Joseph 
Phelps et al., Privacy Concerns and Consumer Willingness to Provide Personal Information, 19 J. PUB. 
POL’Y & MARKETING 27, 27-28 (2000). 
318 See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012 (Magazine), at 30 
(relating how Target developed an algorithm that accurately identified a teenage daughter as 
pregnant—before her own father knew). 
319 James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Examines Social Networks of U.S. Citizens, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2013, at A1. 
320 Target’s recent data breach provides another recent example: in late 2013 and early 2014, 
details emerged surrounding a massive data breach involving shoppers’ personal information. The 
hacked data included personally identifying information and encrypted PINs from debit cards. 
The software used to hack Target’s system was apparently available for sale to the public for just 
$1800. Paula Rosenblum, The Target Data Breach Is Becoming a Nightmare, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2014, 
2:22 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/paularosenblum/2014/01/17/the-target-data-breach-is-becoming-
a-nightmare/ [http://perma.cc/4BVH-S6CB]. 
321 See, e.g., Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy, and 
Shifting Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 61 (2013) (“There seem to be several categories of 
corporate behavior that customers and commentators have begun to label ‘creepy’ for lack of a better 
word.”). But see id. at 64 (“[P]erceptions of social-media-based customer service are clearly ambivalent.”).  
322 MADDEN, supra note 100, at 4. The report noted, however, that “[a]t the same time that 
Americans express these broad sensitivities toward various kinds of information, they are actively 
engaged in negotiating the benefits and risks of sharing this data in their daily interactions with 
friends, family, co-workers, businesses and government.” Id. at 7. 
323 Cf. Hagel & Rayport, supra note 101, at 55 (“[T]o view such [customer] rebellions [against 
information-gathering practices] as concerns about privacy is to misunderstand them.”). 
324  Alessandro Acquisti et al., Preface to DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES, 
AND PRACTICES, at ix (Alessandro Acquisti et al. eds., 2008). 
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occur where individuals involuntarily share information.325 Antitrust law is 
perfectly inverse: it is concerned only with voluntary exchanges.326 Antitrust 
courts, enforcers, and theorists speak of market or monopoly “power,” but 
they do not mean the power to force counterparties to transact against their 
will.327 Even a monopolist or cartel faces a downward-sloping demand curve 
and cannot charge its customers infinite amounts.328 The customers who 
transact with a monopolist or cartel do so of their own volition and are 
individually made better off by the exchange.329 If customers could act 
together, they could refuse to deal on the monopolist’s or cartel’s unfavorable 
terms, successfully neutralizing the upstream market power.330 
In zero-price markets, privacy law is concerned with ensuring that 
individuals’ information remains confidential when its release or use was not 
bargained for as part of a voluntary exchange.331 Antitrust law does not 
concern itself with such harm. Instead, modern antitrust law seeks to 
protect the competitive process, thereby promoting consumer welfare.332 
The right protected is not Warren and Brandeis’s “general right of the 
 
325 See generally Daniel Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 484-85 (2006) 
(prefacing a proposed taxonomy of privacy violations with the observation that “[i]f a person 
consents to most of these activities, there is no privacy violation” (emphasis added)). Alternatively, 
a tort response could address “invasive consumer data profiling”—but again, this proposal targets 
“collecting and selling or leasing an extensive consumer data profile without consumer consent.” 
Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer 
Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 69 (2003) (emphasis added). 
326 Jenny B. Wahl, Introduction to ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT LAW, ANTITRUST LAW, 
AND SAFETY REGULATIONS, at vii (Jenny B. Wahl ed., 1998) (discussing how antitrust laws provide 
oversight of voluntary exchanges between producers and consumers). 
327 See Einer Elhauge, How Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforcement by Replacing It 
with Ineffective Forms of Arbitration, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 771, 774 (2015) (“[V]irtually all 
antitrust violations require the consent of the defendant’s customers. If defendants enter into a 
cartel or merger that raises prices, buyers could in theory defeat it by refusing to pay . . . . [Likewise, 
e]xclusionary conduct works only if buyers consent to it.”). 
328 See, e.g., supra note 156 and accompanying text.  
329 Cf. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 
(2004) (noting that the defendant monopolist in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 
472 U.S. 585, 608 (1985), terminated a “voluntary” and “thus presumably profitable” course of 
dealing (emphasis omitted)). 
330 See Elhauge, supra note 327, at 774-75 (“[B]uyers in markets have a collective action 
problem. If buyers acted together, then they would refuse to consent to conduct that harms them 
all. But acting individually, each buyer has incentives to agree to inflated prices or exclusionary 
conditions . . . . The whole reason we have antitrust laws is to provide a collective action solution, 
via statute, to our collective action problem.”). 
331 See Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer Protection, and 
the Right [Approach] to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 121, 154 (2015) (“[Consumer protection laws] 
focus on the reasonable consumer and ensuring individual consumers get the benefit of the bargain.”). 
332 See supra Sections III.B-C.  
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individual to be let alone.”333 Antitrust law protects the right to the fruits of 
a competitive marketplace: in zero-price markets, the right to receive the 
best possible products in exchange for the least possible amount of 
information. Abandoning oversight of zero-price markets to privacy law 
simply because information (instead of money) is the relevant currency 
would be a grave error.334 The objection risks harming the very consumers 
whom privacy law is meant to protect,335 and it should be rejected accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
“Free” products are not free. They are, instead, exchanged within markets. 
Confronted as it is by the critical and growing importance of zero-price 
products to the broader economy, the antitrust enterprise must take up its 
congressionally mandated role: providing oversight of competition in zero-price 
markets. Already, massive consumer welfare harms have likely resulted from 
the collective failure to do so. Yet this past failure need not dictate the 
future. Recognizing that antitrust law encompasses zero-price markets is 
long overdue. This Article begins the correction process by laying the 
foundations necessary for a coherent and rational antitrust policy.  
 
333 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890). 
334 Professor Pasquale argues that markets based heavily on information-cost extraction are 
too inherently dysfunctional for antitrust—with its normative aim of safeguarding competitive 
markets—to be of use. Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1009, 1015-16 (2013). Yet there is a competitive process to be protected in zero-price markets, though it is 
likely less robust than in some more traditional markets. Again, no market is perfect, and Congress 
mandated that U.S. antitrust laws have very broad applicability. See supra Section II.A. 
335 Peter Swire, Protecting Consumers: Privacy Matters in Antitrust Analysis, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Oct. 19, 2007), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/regulation/news/2007/10/19/3564/protecting-
consumers-privacy-matters-in-antitrust-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/YM5D-BYLX]. Swire observes that 
“consumers ‘pay’ more for a good if greater privacy intrusions are contrary to their preferences. 
Under standard economic analysis, and standard antitrust analysis, harm to consumer preferences 
should be part of the regulatory homework for the competition agencies—such harms should be 
considered along with other harms and benefits from a proposed merger.” Id.; see also supra Section III.C. 
